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Introduction
Conventional wisdom holds that the world trade system evolved from a
power-based to a rules-based regime. “To a large degree,” one of the pioneers of the academic study of international trade notes, “the history of
civilization may be described as a gradual evolution from a power oriented
1
approach, in the state of nature, towards a rule oriented approach.” In a
steady, unidirectional process of legalization, the argument goes, trade law
2
has gradually replaced trade politics. In particular, the creation ten years
3
ago of the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) is commonly portrayed as
a constitutional moment when the stability of the rule of law finally
eclipsed the caprices of politics and diplomacy. In support of this theory,
proponents invariably point to the WTO’s new dispute settlement mecha4
nism, which, unlike that of its predecessor, the General Agreement on
5
6
Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”), is compulsory and fully automatic. Com1. John H. Jackson, The Crumbling Institutions of the Liberal Trade System, 12 J. World
Trade L. 93, 99 (1978). This quotation also appears in, inter alia, John Jackson, The World Trading System: Law and Policy of International Economic Relations 110 (2d ed. 1997). See also
R. E. Hudec, Review Article, Free Trade, Sovereignty, Democracy: The Future of the World Trade
Organization, 1 World Trade Rev. 211, 219–20 (2002) (“The conventional history of GATT/WTO
dispute settlement (for which I may be partly responsible) teaches that GATT dispute settlement
evolved from a ‘diplomatic’ instrument into a ‘judicial’ instrument.”).
2. See, e.g., Judith Goldstein et al., Introduction: Legalization and World Politics, 54 Int’l
Org. 385, 389 (1982) (referring to a victory for trade “legalists” over trade “pragmatists”); Miquel
Montañà i Mora, A GATT with Teeth: Law Wins Over Politics in the Resolution of International
Trade Disputes, 31 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 103 (1993); Arie Reich, From Diplomacy to Law: The
Juridicization of International Trade Relations, 17 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 775, 777 (1996–97).
3. Marrakesh Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 108 Stat.
4809, 1867 U.N.T.S. 14 [hereinafter WTO Agreement].
4. WTO Agreement, supra note 3, Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes, Annex II, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter DSU].
5. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55. U.N.T.S. 194
[hereinafter GATT].
6. Pursuant to the DSU, a defendant can no longer block the establishment of a panel or the
adoption of panel or Appellate Body reports by the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body (“DSB”).
DSU, supra note 4, arts. 6.1, 16.4, 17.14.
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bined with the WTO’s expansion into a host of new regulatory areas, such
as health and safety standards, services, trade, and intellectual property pro7
tection; and its single package approach (all but two of the more than thirty
8
WTO agreements are binding on all 148 member countries); the conclusion
that the WTO possesses a thickened legal-normative structure is, indeed,
inescapable. The common perception is, therefore, that at the expense of
member countries’ sovereignty (less politics), the authority of the WTO
9
gradually expanded (more law).
Within this prevailing school of thought (from-politics-to-law) it is a
prominent theme that for trade liberalization to occur the process must be
unlinked from the horse-trading and instabilities of domestic politics and
10
representative democracy. For utilitarian proponents of this idea, much the
way we rely on experts to cure diseases, or as most countries have a
politically independent central bank to ensure price stability, so does the
world need a trade regime that is sealed off from the excesses of domestic
11
and international politics. In the absence of an insulated regime, the
argument goes, concentrated special interest groups commanding
disproportionate leverage, in particular owners and workers in industries
that are habitually injured by free trade, would overshadow more diffuse
majority concerns that favor free trade, such as consumers paying less for
imports. Since the resulting protectionism would inherently harm the
majority, and in that sense not be democratic, WTO agreements tying the
hands of domestic politicians to the mast of free trade “act to restrain
protectionist interest groups, thereby promoting both free trade and
12
democracy.” In other words, the argument concludes that, rather than a
7. WTO Agreement, supra note 3, Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Dec. 15, 1993, Annex 1A [hereinafter SPS]; WTO Agreement, supra note 3,
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, Annex 1A [hereinafter TBT]; WTO
Agreement, supra note 3, General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Annex 1B [hereinafter GATS]; WTO Agreement, supra note 3, Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Annex 1C [hereinafter TRIPS].
8. The plurilateral trade agreements listed in Annex 4 are binding only on members that
have accepted them separately. WTO Agreement, supra note 3, art. 2. The listing of those agreements in Annex 4 does not bind all WTO signatories. Id.
9. See Lori’s War, Foreign Pol’y, Spring 2000, at 29, 34–40 (interviewing Lori Wallach
regarding perceived role of WTO); Alan Wm. Wolff, Problems with WTO Dispute Settlement, 2 Chi.
J. Int’l L. 417, 420–21 (2001); John Ragosta et al., WTO Dispute Settlement: The System is Flawed
and Must Be Fixed, 37 Int’l Law. 697, 698–99 (2003); see also David E. Sanger, A Blink From the
Bush Administration, N.Y. Times, Dec. 5, 2003, at A28 (touting the August 30, 2002 WTO ruling in
the United States’ foreign sales corporations matter, and its subsequent implementation by the Bush
administration, as the international law “equivalent of Marbury v. Madison”).
10. John O. McGinnis & Mark L. Movsesian, The World Trade Constitution, 114 Harv. L.
Rev. 511, 515–16 (2000).
11. The need to restrict discretionary powers of governments in furtherance of the common
good is explained with reference to the so-called time consistency problem; that is, the inability of
political institutions to bind themselves for future periods given their exposure to strategic behavior
of private agents. See Finn E. Kydland & Edward C. Prescott, Rules Rather Than Discretion: The
Inconsistency of Optimal Plans, 85 J. Pol. Econ. 473, 481 (1977).
12.

McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 10, at 515.
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threat to sovereignty and representative government, the WTO is a
13
fundamental and inherent guarantor of democracy. Others base a similar
approach not on utilitarian, welfare-maximization calculations, but on
constitutional theory. Just as most countries have human rights and
constitutional guarantees to protect against political dictatorship by the
majority, so does the world require economic freedoms of a constitutional
nature to protect citizens against economic abuse or failure of representative
14
government. From both this utilitarian and from the constitutional
perspective, the commonly perceived trajectory of world trade from politics
to law is, therefore, not simply a historical observation. It is a prescriptive,
normative goal.
This Article contests the traditional view of the evolution of the world
trade system. Rather than a unidirectional process of legalization focused
exclusively on the system’s normative structure, Part I of the Article, “The
Explosion of the GATT Club,” recounts the transformation from GATT to
WTO as a bidirectional interaction between law and politics; in particular,
between the system’s legal-normative structure and its political, decisionmaking branch. Legal change in the world trade system has, indeed, been
profound. Yet, it could only happen and is best understood in its interaction
with the system’s political process. My claim is that this law-and-politics
narrative, as opposed to the conventional from-politics-to-law story, better
explains the evolution of the world trade system. It better explains, in particular, how countries could ever agree to decisionmaking by simple
majority in the original GATT, what reassured them to surrender their veto
right in the WTO dispute process, and why today WTO members so vehemently defend the consensus rule for political decisions.
To tell this alternative story the Article borrows from the theoretical
framework of exit and voice, introduced in 1970 by the economist Albert
15
Hirschman and later brilliantly applied by Joseph Weiler to the transforma16
tion of the European Community (“E.C.”). Crudely put, following
Hirschman’s insight, there is an inverse, bidirectional relation between exit
and voice. In the context of this Article, slightly bending and extending
13. Id.; see also Robert E. Hudec, “Circumventing” Democracy: The Political Morality of
Trade Negotiations, 25 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 311 (1993). Rather than focusing on domestic
consumers, however, Hudec highlights the major benefits of trade from the viewpoint of domestic
exporters and foreign producers. Id at 314.
14. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Constitutional Functions and Constitutional
Problems of International Economic Law 387–92 (1991).
15. Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty (1970). In Hirschman’s opinion,
when faced with dysfunctional behavior by or in an organization (be it a firm, tribe, government, or
international organization), that is, a deterioration in the organization’s performance, two endogenous forces of recovery are possible. Firstly, the client of the firm or member of the institution can
leave the organization (e.g., buy her goods elsewhere), which ought to put pressure on the organization to improve (the exit option). Id. at 21. Secondly, the client of the firm or member of the
institution can protest or complain to the management of the organization pushing it to improve its
goods or services (the voice option). Id. at 30.
16. J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 Yale L.J. 2403, 2410–12 (1991),
reprinted and updated in J.H.H. Weiler, The Constitution of Europe (1999), 10–101.
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Hirschman’s concepts, “exit” is characterized by the lack of law or discipline or the thickness of a system’s legal-normative structure, which offers
easy options to defect from the cooperative regime. Similarly, “voice” is
characterized by the broader notions of politics, participation, or levels of
contestation in the political decisionmaking process, such as offering abundant opportunities for expressing preferences for cooperative decisions.
Closure of exit options (more law or discipline) leads to higher demands for
voice (more politics or participation). Conversely, higher levels of voice
(more politics) are an absolute requirement for enabling and sustaining the
closure of exit (more law).
Through this lens, my claim is that the world trade system evolved from
a combination of high exit and low voice in the text of GATT 1947 to a
combination of low exit and high voice in the WTO. That is, it evolved from
low discipline or law, with many escape clauses and weak enforcement, and
low participation or politics, with a highly technical and technocratic operation run by simple majority vote, to high discipline or law (stricter rules and
automatic enforcement) and relatively high participation or politics, a globally contested organization strictly run by consensus. One major
consequence of this claim is that increased legalization or discipline such as
more supervision by the WTO and less exit, must not come at the expense of
less politics in the form of less voice from member countries and their constituencies. Rather, more discipline and harder law (less exit) lead to and
require more politics and higher levels of participation (more voice). Hence,
both the WTO and its member states were strengthened. Most importantly,
the WTO holds a stronger enforcement mechanism and the states retain a
veto in the political process. Another crucial insight of this claim is that the
often referred-to “institutional paradox” between the WTO’s consensusbased, inefficient rulemaking procedures and its highly efficient, automatic
17
dispute settlement system is readily explained. Rather than a paradox or
puzzle, the juxtaposition of a strong, automatic dispute settlement system
(high discipline, low exit) and a tedious, consensus-based rulemaking process (high voice/participation) is a logical—although not necessarily
optimal—phenomenon. High levels of legalization and discipline, such as a
strong enforcement mechanism, entail limited exit options and naturally
require and lead to high demands for voice via participation and political
input, such as consensus decisionmaking.
Moving from the descriptive and analytical to the normative, Part II of
this Article, “The Threat of a WTO Fortress,” challenges the view that a
17. I. Garcia Bercero, Functioning of the WTO System: Elements for Possible Institutional
Reform, 6 Int’l Trade L. & Reg. 103, 105 (2000); see also Claude Barfield, Free Trade,
Sovereignty, Democracy: The Future of the World Trade Organization 1 (2001); ClausDieter Ehlermann, Tensions between the Dispute Settlement Process and the Diplomatic and TreatyMaking Activities of the WTO, 1 World Trade Rev. 301, 305 (2002); John H. Jackson, The WTO
“Constitution” and Proposed Reforms: Seven “Mantras” Revisited, 4 J. Int’l Econ. L. 67, 77
(2001); Frieder Roessler, The Institutional Balance between the Judicial and the Political Organs of
the WTO, in New Directions in International Economic Law: Essays in Honour of John H.
Jackson, 325, 338 (Marco Bronckers & Reinhard Quick eds., 2000).
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choice must be made between politics and law or, put differently, between,
on the one hand, democratic representation, participation, contestation, and
the inherent flexibility that comes with it and, on the other hand, discipline,
precommitment, and some degree of government by experts or exportdriven interests shielded from capture and popular ignorance. On the contrary, my claim is that a legitimate and efficient trading system requires both
politics and law, or more particularly, appropriate balances between participation and discipline, flexibility and precommitment, accountability and
insulation, popular support and expertise, and input and output legitimacy.
At the time of writing, however, the world trade system is out of balance. Over the years it gradually moved beyond the technicalities of import
duties to cover more politically sensitive areas such as health regulation and
intellectual property. Now that it matters, in that it affects not just traders but
everyone in society, and its disciplines and law have become real because
WTO rules became stricter and more strictly enforced, the WTO has been
unable to meet the correspondingly high demands for participation, accountability, and contestation. In large part because of its foundational
mechanics (overcoming protectionism by insulating export-interests from
domestic politics) the world trade system remains too technocratic and too
isolated from popular support and has, in places, become too rigid or legalized to respond to valid flexibility demands of representative politics. In
sum, there is not enough participation or politics to sustain the high levels of
discipline or law. Put differently, the WTO suffers from a lack of popular
support, loyalty, and input legitimacy to continue its highly disciplined and
legalized operation.
Yet, at the same time, unlike the early years of GATT, this lack of input
legitimacy is no longer offset by progress in actual trade liberalization or
output legitimacy. The increase in participation or politics that did take place
since GATT’s creation, in particular the insistence by countries on a political
veto and decisionmaking by consensus, is currently stifling further welfareenhancing liberalization and preventing much needed reforms to make the
system more equitable for developing countries and more open and supported by civil society. As a result, the WTO now lives in what one could
call the worst of both worlds: it misses the benefits of popular support or
politics (lack of input legitimacy) and must do without the benefits of further trade liberalization and a rule of law perceived as fair and equitable for
everyone (lack of output legitimacy).
The most common proposals to reform the WTO, including the January
18
2005 Sutherland Report on the future of the WTO, do not take account of
this delicate interaction and balance between law and politics. They focus
rather on just one side of the spectrum without weighing the countervailing

18. Peter Sutherland et al., Report by the Consultative Board to the DirectorGeneral Supachai Panitchpakdi, The Future of the WTO: Addressing Institutional
Challenges in the New Millennium (2004) [hereinafter Sutherland Report].
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19

effects on the other. This Article examines in particular the following three
proposals: (1) further legalize or depoliticize the WTO with, for example,
20
legal standing for private parties and fewer escape clauses; (2) facilitate
decisionmaking in the WTO political process through, for example, majority
21
voting or executive bodies; and (3) reintroduce politics into the WTO judi22
cial branch with, for example, political vetoes against dispute rulings.
Knowing that the present combination is one of high discipline that led
to and requires high levels of participation, my claim is that, when implemented in isolation, all three proposals are counterintuitive. First, further
legalization, without the necessary political support, would put even more
pressure on the voice mechanism and demand even higher levels of participation in an organization where such levels are already too low. It would
only worsen the deadlock in the political branch and risk being counterproductive by putting pressure on some members, particularly the most
powerful ones, to leave the organization. Second, although majority voting
could facilitate the decisionmaking process and thus, like further legalization, boost the WTO’s short-term output legitimacy, the limitation in voice
and participation that it would engender through members losing their veto
over new rules risks undermining the support for, and legitimacy of, both the
strong dispute process and, in the long run, the trade system as a whole. In
the absence of a high enough level of “loyalty,” Hirschman’s third notion
23
besides exit and voice, or support for the WTO, more—not less—voice or
participation from individual WTO members and their constituencies is
needed. Third, reverting to GATT, diplomatic-style dispute settlement, reinjecting politics into the dispute process itself, may entangle decisionmaking deadlocks. Less discipline would, indeed, require less participation. Yet,
this proposal neglects almost 100 years of trade history. If the inter-war period and GATT have taught us one lesson it is that for actual trade
liberalization to occur, trade commitments must have legal value and be
backed by a strong, independent dispute mechanism. This is all the more
necessary today, when most trade restrictions take the form of covert nontariff barriers, often going to the heart of state sovereignty, for which countries
would be hard-pressed to exercise a veto if they had one.
19. For notable exceptions, see Robert Hudec, The GATT Legal System and World
Trade Diplomacy (2d ed. 1990) [hereinafter Hudec, Diplomacy], and more recently, Armin von
Bogdandy, Law and Politics in the WTO—Strategies to Cope with a Deficient Relationship, in 5
Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations L. 609 (Jochen A. Frowein & Rüdiger Wolfrum eds.,
2001), and Richard H. Steinberg, Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive, Constitutional, and
Political Constraints, 98 Am. J. Int’l L. 247 (2004).
20. See, e.g., Petersmann, supra note 14, at 459–62; John A. Ragosta, Unmasking the
WTO—Access to the DSB System: Can the WTO DSB Live Up to the Moniker “World Trade
Court”?, 31 L. & Pol’y Int’l Bus. 739, 741 (2000).
21. See, e.g., Thomas Cottier & Satoko Takenoshita, The Balance of Power in WTO Decision-Making: Towards Weighted Voting in Legislative Response, 58 Aussenwirtschaft 171, 184–
86 (2003).
22.

Barfield, supra note 17, at 7.

23.

See Hirschman, supra note 15, at 76–105
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Rather than portraying constitutionalization or detachment from politics
as the system’s normative goal as the utilitarian and constitutional schools
24
described earlier, this Article stresses the usefulness and need for politics,
participation, flexibility, and occasional crisis. Equally, instead of advocating a wholesale reintroduction of representative politics in the world trade
25
system as both conservative sovereigntists and left-leaning cosmopolitans
26
tend to do, this Article accepts the need for precommitment and discipline
to tame the protectionist excesses of representative democracy. Without such
hand-tying, the WTO would soon be ineffective and fail to fulfill its crucially important mandate of welfare-enhancing trade liberalization. Hence,
as much as law needs politics, so politics needs law. The difference between
these two, in my view, flawed extremes, focused, respectively, on ”just more
law” or “just more politics” is, however, that discipline or legalization without sufficient politics or accountability risks an unsupported and
unsustainable system that in the meantime imposes its whim on the people
in the name of economic efficiency: efficiency without loyalty. In contrast,
politics, participation, and flexibility without sufficient discipline or precommitment would lead to an inefficient, even inactive, trade regime in
which important gains from trade are foregone: loyalty without efficiency.
As an alternative to such reform proposals, focusing exclusively on either law or politics, discipline or participation, this Article pleads for a more
comprehensive reform package that takes account of both the law and politics poles. On the law or discipline side, my claim is that rather than
embracing ever more legalization, the WTO needs to maintain a certain
level of flexibility or exit options, especially those fine-tuned to consumer
welfare and democratic politics. In particular, it must move away from the
single-package orthodoxy and permit differentiation through a multiplespeed WTO. In addition, the system must continue to provide for broad substantive exceptions, meaningful safeguard mechanisms, waivers, tariff and
other re-negotiations, temporary compensation or suspension in the event of
noncompliance, and the scope to settle disputes—and regulate trade-related
questions in other international fora—in deviation from WTO rules for as
long as third-party rights are left untouched. Rather than being birth defects
that need to be cured through gradual legalization, these flexibility and exit
options, including the application of WTO law in the wider context of international law, must be clarified and maintained.
On the politics or participation side, the Article rejects the relatively
easy way out of decisionmaking by executive bodies or qualified majorities.
Instead, at this point in time, the WTO needs the high levels of voice, participation, and contestation linked to the consensus principle. Although the
WTO’s decisionmaking practice is messy, takes time, and can be made more
24.

See McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 10; Petersmann, supra note 14.

25.

See, e.g., Barfield, supra note 17.

26. See id.; Lori’s War, supra note 9; see also Robert Howse, From Politics to Technocracy—
and Back Again: The Fate of the Multilateral Trading Regime, 96 Am. J. Int’l L. 94 (2002).
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inclusive, the benefits linked to consensus—not to be confused with unanimity—outweigh its costs. More importantly, if the WTO is to survive as a
legitimate institution that effectively liberalizes trade it will need the participation, loyalty, and support, not just of governmental trade elites and
technocrats but also of consumers and citizens at large. In addition, it must
engage in the muddy process of coordination and contestation with, and
among, other international treaty regimes set up to correct market failures or
accompany free trade with social and other noneconomic safety nets. Besides procedural reforms that enhance the transparency of, and access to, the
WTO, such loyalty and support through participation and contestation requires a substantive shift in the trade system’s paradigm, mechanics, and
rules and exceptions, away from the proxy of export-driven, producer interests with allegedly only majority concerns in mind, and more directly
aligned with consumer and citizen interests in both poor and rich countries
for whose benefit the world trade system was set up in the first place.
I do realize that the combination of maintaining politically responsive
flexibility or exit options and increasing levels of voice or participation by
both governments and their peoples, including that required for new agreements, implies that global economic integration may not always be optimal.
It will make progress toward further liberalization messy, slow, and difficult
to achieve and will face the occasional political deadlock. My claim is, however, that this lethargy—or, to use a term common in European law,
lourdeur—is the price to pay for the long-term survival and legitimacy of the
world trade system. Moreover, the subtle combination of more participation
and limited but clearly defined exit options in the background ought to facilitate political agreement. Given the ex post flexibility, countries will be
less nervous to engage in new rules. In turn, when rules are agreed to with
higher levels of participation and support, they are more likely to be complied with and resort to the exit options enshrined in the system ought to be
exceptional. As a result, limited exit options may actually reinforce rather
than undermine the system’s credibility.
I. The Explosion of the GATT Club
Part I of this Article tells the alternative story of the transformation of
the world trade system as a bidirectional interaction between law and politics in lieu of the conventional from-politics-to-law narrative focused
exclusively on the trade system’s dispute settlement branch. It describes
three distinct periods: (i) the original creation of GATT in 1947 (“The Politics of a Gentlemen’s Club”), (ii) the GATT in operation between 1947 and
1994 (“GATT’s Quiet Mutation”), and (iii) the creation of the WTO and its
first ten years of operation (“The WTO Eruption”).
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A. GATT 1947: The Politics of a Gentlemen’s Club
1. Why Was a World Trade Regime Needed in the First Place?
“If economists ruled the world,” Paul Krugman notes, “there would be
27
no need for a World Trade Organization.” Following standard economics,
free trade maximizes national welfare. Therefore, rational governments
ought to liberalize trade unilaterally, without the need for an international
regime. The reality, of course, is different. Governments face both economic
and political incentives to restrict trade, and international coordination was
needed to effect its liberalization.
One school of thought, the terms-of-trade school, focuses on economic
28
incentives. In economic terms, they argue, large countries—that is, those
big enough to influence world prices—are tempted to increase their terms of
trade (i.e., reduce import prices) and thereby enhance national welfare
through the imposition of a so-called optimal tariff rate. Doing so harms
foreign exporters. However, since foreigners do not vote, governments are
unlikely to factor in those externalities. At the same time, if all nations impose such an optimal tariff—be it unilaterally or to retaliate against the tariff
of another nation—most gains of trade are neutralized and all countries are
29
likely to be worse off compared to a situation without tariffs. This puts
countries in something like a large-scale prisoner’s dilemma. For the termsof-trade school, the creation of GATT is explained as a way out of this dilemma. Through the exchange of reciprocal “concessions” of market
access—originally tariff reductions—countries steered away from so-called
beggar-thy-neighbor policies making everyone worse off. Instead, reciprocal
commitments to liberalize trade, backed up by the threat of retaliation in the
event of defection, forces countries to take account of the harm they cause to
others. As a result, GATT ensures a win-win situation for all sides.
A second school of thought focuses on political incentives to restrict
30
trade. It relies on public choice and constitutional theories to explain the

27. Paul Krugman, What Should Trade Negotiators Negotiate About?, 35 J. Econ. Literature 113, 113 (1997).
28. See Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, The Economics of the World Trading
System (2002); Harry G. Johnson, Optimum Tariffs and Retaliation, 21 Rev. Econ. Stud. 142
(1954); Raymond Riezman, Tariff Retaliation from a Strategic Viewpoint, 48 S. Econ. J. 583 (1982)
(modeling the tariff game as a prisoner’s dilemma); Edward Tower, The Optimum Quota and Retaliation, 42 Rev. Econ. Stud. 623 (1975) (analyzing quota instead of tariff retaliation).
29. A large country could be better off by imposing a tariff even in the case of foreign retaliation as long as its price elasticity of import demand is larger than the corresponding elasticity of
its trading partners. Johnson, supra note 28, at 144.
30. Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, Interest Groups and Trade Policy 111
(2002); J. Michael Finger, Protectionist Rules and Internationalist Discretion in the Making of
National Trade Policy, in New Institutional Arrangements for the World Economy 310
(Hans-Jürgen Vosgerau ed., 1989); Wilfred J. Ethier, Political Externalities, Nondiscrimination, and a Multilateral World 4 (Penn Institute for Economic Research, Working Paper
No. 02-030, 2002), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=333006; Wilfred J. Ethier, Trade
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creation of GATT. The benefits of free trade are long-term, diffuse, and
fragmented across consumers, while its costs, although mostly smaller, are
felt immediately and directly in layers of society that are best organized,
such as import-competing industries and organized labor. Because of collective action problems, the supporters of free trade, such as consumers, have
less incentive to incur the cost of lobbying. Those suffering from liberalization, in contrast, are geographically concentrated. Their contributions to the
industry’s cause are more readily mobilized and monitored. As a result, protectionist groups wield more political clout. Consequently, governments face
pressures to restrict trade that, more often than not, outweigh those in support of free trade. International coordination, that is, the exchange of
reciprocal “concessions” of market access, is then explained as adding the
weight of exporters to the less-organized domestic free-trade camp of consumers in order to overcome the disproportionate impact of protectionist
31
groups (import-competing industries and labor). For the constitutional
branch of this school of thought, trade agreements fulfill a true constitutional function, namely the protection of economic liberties and majority
interests against government interference and abuse by special-interest
32
groups.
A third perspective focuses on the discriminatory nature of pre-GATT
trade relations largely determined by colonial preferences and overlapping
33
bilateral trade agreements. Rather than pursuing the internalization of
cross-border externalities (the terms-of-trade school) or the maximization of
national, consumer welfare against abuse by protectionist minorities (public
choice and constitutional schools), in this third view the GATT emerged to
deal with “the mess of the existing bilateral and discriminatory trade
34
policies.” In support of this approach, it is pointed out that, to this date, the
Agreements Based on Political Externalities 7 (Penn Institute for Economic Research, Working Paper 03-035, 2002), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=474562.
31.

See McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 10, at 526–30.

32. Petersmann, supra note 14, at 132–33; Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Trade Policy as a
Constitutional Problem, 41 Aussenwirtschaft 405 (1986); Jan Tumlir, Conceptions of the International Economic and Legal Order, 8 World Econ. 85, 87 (1985) (reviewing John H. Jackson
et al., Implementing the Tokyo Round: National Constitutions and International
Economic Rules (1984)); Jan Tumlir, International Economic Order and Democratic Constitutionalism, 34 ORDO 71, 82–83 (1983).
33. Between 1934 and 1945 the United States, for example, negotiated and accepted thirtytwo so-called reciprocal trade agreements. John H. Jackson, World Trade and the Law of
GATT: A Legal Analysis of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 37 (1969). Especially for the United States, the GATT was more efficient than endless bilateral agreements—in
addition, GATT was the United States’ only institutional option under which to achieve its trade
objectives given that the United States, unlike other major trading nations (France, Britain, etc.), had
no regional alternative and could not count on existing imperial or regional trade ties. John Odell &
Barry Eichengreen, The United States, the ITO, and the WTO: Exit Options, Agent Slack, and Presidential Leadership, in The WTO as an International Organization 181, 183 (Anne O.
Krueger ed., 1998).
34. Patrick A. Messerlin, Non-discrimination, Welfare Balances and WTO Rules: An Historical Perspective, in Preparing the Doha Development Round: Challenges to the
Legitimacy and Efficiency of the World Trading System 154, 156 (Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann
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world trade system remains focused on non-discrimination as opposed to
economic efficiency and the protection of producer as opposed to consumer
35
welfare. From this perspective, the system neither avoids harmful crossborder externalities nor does it inherently protect domestic consumers. Instead of inherently protecting the majority, the trade system, thereby, risks
elevating special (producer) interests above consumer concerns and beyond
36
the control of domestic politics.
2. The Original GATT Bargain: It’s All Politics
Whatever the underlying theory of why a multilateral trade system was,
and remains, needed, the immediate context of GATT’s creation in 1947 was
37
the jolt of the Great Depression and World War II. The conclusion of
GATT constituted a major departure from previous forms of trade cooperation. Ever since the creation of the League of Nations after World War I,
international conferences had been convened to address deteriorating trade
38
conditions, but the world needed the wake-up call of another world war to
move beyond the lofty rhetoric of hortatory declarations and agree to more
specific commitments that would be supported by a normative structure.
Whilst GATT did inaugurate the creation of a legal-normative regime for
world trade, at its core it remained a profoundly political bargain. Although
GATT negotiators realized that some degree of normative pull was needed,
if only to avoid the mistakes of the past, they also voiced a strong distrust of
lawyers and the rigid legal method, which, in their minds, would not enable
39
flexible responses to real trade problems. As a result, what kept GATT toed., 2003), available at http://www.iue.it/RSCAS/e-texts/200405_e-WTO-Petersmann.pdf. Interestingly, as Messerlin points out, when GATT was created in 1947 the notions of producer and
consumer welfare remained underdeveloped. It is, therefore, hard to conclude that the GATT was
based on economic analysis. Id. at 155 (“If the key economic concepts were largely discovered by
the late 1800s and formalized by the 1930s, their operational form, that is, their capacity to answer
questions raised by decision makers in a straight forward and computable manner, was nonexistent.” (citation omitted)).
35. See Henrik Horn & Petros C. Mavroidis, Economic and Legal Aspects of the MostFavored Nation Clause, 17 Eur. J. Pol. Econ. 233, 234–36 (2001); Petros C. Mavroidis, Come
Together? Producer Welfare, Consumer Welfare and WTO Rules, in Preparing the Doha Development Round: Challenges to the Legitimacy and Efficiency of the World Trading
Form, supra note 34, at 137.
36.
(1999).

Eyal Benvenisti, Exit and Voice in the Age of Globalization, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 167

37. World War I shook the very foundations of economic liberalism and destroyed the economy of Europe. See Clair Wilcox, A Charter for World Trade 5–9 (1949). In the interwar
period (the Great Depression), a major wave of protectionism swept across the globe. One after the
other, in a cascade of retaliatory action, countries imposed quantitative restrictions and prohibitively
high tariffs on imports and manipulated their exchange rates. These “beggar-thy-neighbor” policies,
rather than achieving their purpose of increased competitiveness and lower unemployment rates,
caused economic chaos and, according to many observers, were responsible to some degree for
World War II itself. See Richard N. Gardner, Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy 1–4 (1956).
38.

Hudec, Diplomacy, supra note 19, at 5–9.

39. See id. at 25–26 (quoting from a 1932 report of the League of Nations’ Economic Committee, calling for a nonjudicial procedure to resolve economic disputes); id. at 29 (quoting a U.K.
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gether was not so much an abstract respect for legal rules, but rather the political and economic need to keep intact a negotiated balance of tariff
concessions, originally exchanged in 1947 and subsequently expanded in
further rounds of trade negotiations. Reciprocal tariff reductions through
Part I of GATT were at the apex of this GATT bargain. This tariff deal was,
in turn, supported by the standard trade policy rules set out in Part II, such
as national treatment and prohibitions on quantitative restrictions. Part II
was crucial to ensure that commercial opportunities offered by tariff reductions would not be nullified by trade policy instruments other than tariffs.
No strong enforcement mechanism to keep this balance afloat was needed.
After all, the balance was struck because of reciprocal gains reaped from
exchanging tariff reductions. This balance was, in turn, kept because of the
threat of reciprocal withdrawals of concessions in case a country would not
meet its end of the bargain. This was the secret of the GATT’s early success.
The original GATT was, therefore, more like a gentlemen’s club than a
legal regime. Its objective was to settle trade problems, not to create or clarify trade law. Flexibility to adapt to economic and political realities
prevailed over the predictability of the rule of law. The GATT club was inspired and run by what became known as “embedded liberalism,” that is, a
common belief amongst the technocratic elites of the original twenty-three
GATT contracting parties—after all, a limited set of like-minded, capitalist
countries—that trade liberalization increases welfare and requires international coordination and discipline, albeit with sufficient room left for
domestic politics to redistribute income and sustain the safety-nets of the
40
welfare state at home.
In this clublike context, it should come as no surprise that in the text of
GATT the equilibrium reached between law and politics, discipline and participation, exit and voice, was one of relatively low levels of politics or
participation combined with equally low levels of law or discipline.
a. Low Levels of Discipline and Law. The original GATT maintained
multiple escape routes and safeguard mechanisms for countries seeking to
avoid GATT basic principles. First, the GATT included broadly defined substantive exceptions: Article XII permitted trade restrictions to safeguard a
country’s balance of payments, Article XVIII allowed for governmental assistance to economic development, and Articles XX and XXI provided for a
broad range of general exceptions ranging from public morals and health to
the protection of national security, historic treasures, and natural exhaustible
resources. Second, and more importantly, GATT also permitted trade restrictions without the need to base them on specific non-protectionist concerns
as is required under most substantive exceptions. Article XIX introduced socalled safeguard measures that permit the reinstatement of trade restrictions
memorandum submitted to the London drafting session of the ITO Charter in 1946, insisting on the
importance of economic judgment).
40. Howse, supra note 26, at 96–98; John Gerard Ruggie, International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order, 36 Int’l Org. 379, 393–
98 (1982).
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when countries are faced with a sudden influx of imports causing serious
injury to their domestic industry. Article VI permitted extra tariffs to offset
so-called dumping, that is, exports sold at less than the normal value of the
products concerned. Article XXVIII set out different procedures for parties
to renegotiate tariff concessions, for whatever reason, on condition that they
offer equivalent liberalization in other products or suffer reciprocal suspensions by other parties. In addition, under Article XXV:5, GATT parties
acting jointly and by two-thirds of votes cast could, in exceptional circumstances, grant a waiver from any GATT obligation. Finally, the so-called
“existing legislation clause” in the GATT’s Protocol of Provisional Application, in force until the creation of the WTO in 1995, grandfathered pre-1947
41
legislation under Part II of GATT.
In the same vein, GATT’s enforcement mechanism (Article XXIII) was
a diplomatic procedure set up to maintain a balance of concessions in the
42
face of future uncertainties, not an independent judicial system to ensure
43
the impartial enforcement of GATT rules. As a result, instead of tackling
breaches of international law obligations, the GATT dispute process focused
on the “nullification or impairment” of GATT benefits. By the same token,
the GATT’s remedy of last resort was to “suspend concessions or other obli44
gations.” The resulting enforcement regime was therefore distinctly unlegal and, somewhat paradoxically, both lenient and strict. On the one hand,
the system was lenient: the customary consequences linked to a breach of an
international law obligation—in legal terms, cessation and reparation, and in
political terms, the reputational costs of breaking the law—were avoided.
On the other hand, however, the system was uniquely strict: parties were
held “responsible” not only for breaches of GATT obligations, but also for
“nullification or impairment” caused by conduct that did not conflict with
any specific GATT provision under so-called non-violation or situation
45
complaints. Finally, confirming the relatively low levels of discipline or

41. Protocol of Provisional Application of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct.
30, 1947, 61 Stat. 2051, 55 U.N.T.S. 308, para. 1(b).
42. As one draftsman put it: “ ‘We shall achieve . . . if our negotiations are successful, a
careful balance of the interests of the contracting parties. This balance rests upon certain assumptions as to the character of the underlying situation in the years to come. And it involves a mutuality
of obligations and benefits. If, with the passage of time, the underlying situation should change or
the benefits accorded any Member should be impaired, the balance would be destroyed. It is the
purpose of [GATT] Article XXIII to restore this balance.’ ” Note by the Secretariat, Non-Violation
Complaints under GATT Article XXIII:2, at 6, U.N. Doc. MTN.GNG/NG13/W/31 (Jul. 14, 1989),
available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/history/urdsu/w31.pdf, quoting U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/A/
PV/6, at 5 (1947).
43. Joost Pauwelyn, Enforcement and Countermeasures in the WTO: Rules are Rules—
Toward a More Collective Approach, 94 Am. J. Int’l L. 335, 339–40 (2000).
44.

GATT, supra note 5, art. XXIII:2.

45. Id. art. XXIII:1(b), (c). Since it was realized that domestic measures, such as subsidies or
product safety standards, that did not directly relate to trade policy could affect the benefits from
tariff reductions and it would be impossible to catalogue all such possibilities (as well as politically
unfeasible for countries to severely circumscribe their domestic powers in this respect in a mere
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constraint, withdrawal from GATT was easy. It sufficed to give sixty days
46
notice.
b. Low Levels of Participation and Politics. If the original GATT reflected low levels of discipline and law, on the politics or voice axis it built
upon equally low levels of participation and approval. GATT was, and was
seen as, a highly technical, tariff-focused operation driven and inspired by
an expert-consensus on embedded liberalism. Far from being the result of
democratic politics, one of the GATT’s core objectives was to curtail the
excesses of representative democracy and the logrolling and protectionism
that came with it. Confirming the distance between Geneva-based negotiators and the people they represented, the U.S. Congress, like many other
parliaments, never even ratified the GATT agreement. Technically speaking,
it was only provisionally applied and never formally entered into force until
47
the creation of the WTO forty-seven years later.
In addition, when it came to making new rules or amendments, equally
low levels of approval and participation were seen as adequate. Pursuant to
GATT Article XXV, broad competences were delegated to GATT contracting parties acting jointly, including to meet and decide “with a view to
48
facilitating the operation and furthering the objectives of [GATT].” Even
more surprising, unless explicitly provided otherwise, these competences
49
could be exercised by a simple majority of the votes cast, with each
contracting party entitled to only one vote and no GATT party entitled to
50
veto power. Joint action under GATT Article XXV, albeit taken by the
tariff agreement), the remedy of nonviolation and situation complaints was added as a final check to
uphold the GATT bargain. See Hudec, Diplomacy, supra note 19, at 23–24.
46. GATT art. XXXI refers to six months. Paragraph 5 of the Protocol of Provisional
Application (which made and kept GATT operational for forty-seven years until the WTO was
created), however, reduced this period to sixty days. Hence, as Jackson noted, “if a nation objected
strenuously enough to a decision of the CONTRACTING PARTIES, it could simply withdraw if it
felt the balance of the advantages obtained through GATT were not sufficient to offset the
disadvantages of the particular decision.” Jackson, supra note 33, at 127.
47. As is well documented, the 1948 Havana Charter, which was supposed to establish a new
International Trade Organization (“ITO”)—as well as its 1955 spin-off, the Organization for Trade
Cooperation (“OTC”)—never came about. See Gardner, supra note 37. On several occasions the
United States Congress refused ratification. As a result, the GATT was provisionally applied (never
actually entering into force) for forty-seven years until, finally, in 1995 the WTO saw the light of
day.
48. GATT, supra note 5, art. XXV. As Frieder Roessler, former GATT legal advisor, noted:
“The Contracting Parties were given the right to meet with a view to furthering the objectives of the
General Agreement to enable them to respond to future, possibly unforeseen, changes. . . . What is
decisive is whether in the current circumstances the discussions of the subject-matter furthers the
objectives of the General Agreement.” Frieder Roessler, The Competence of GATT, J. World Trade
L., June 1987, at 73, 76 (1987). In similar fashion, article 235 grants broad powers to the Community, in particular the Council, to take “action . . . necessary to attain . . . one of the objectives of the
Community.” Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Jan. 22, 1972, art. 235, 1377
U.N.T.S. 12 [hereinafter EEC Treaty].
49.

GATT, supra note 5, art. XXV:4.

50. GATT, supra note 5, art. XXV:3. Since the rules of procedure set the quorum for valid
decisionmaking at a simple majority of contracting parties, Rules of Procedure for Sessions of the
Contracting Parties, GATT. B.I.S.D. (12th Supp.) at 9, 13 (1964), in theory, joint action under
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slightest majority, was binding on all parties, even those who voted against
51
the particular decision. Crucially, in the original GATT, the enforcement
mechanism also was subject to the decisionmaking rule of Article XXV. The
mechanism was set up as a diplomatic process to be run jointly by all GATT
parties, not by independent dispute panels. Complaints, investigations, and
eventual recommendations were, therefore, to be initiated, conducted, and
adopted by simple majority of the votes cast. Based on Article XXV, a single defendant could not block the dispute process.
Finally, GATT amendment procedures permitted equally low levels of
participation. Most GATT rules could be changed by a two-thirds majority
of the parties. Although any amendment bound only those GATT parties that
accepted it, GATT parties could thus be outvoted on an amendment. Whilst
in line with the general principle of state consent, this did permit normative
52
differentiation between countries or a multiple-speed GATT.
3. GATT 1947 as a Bidirectional Interaction
Between Law and Politics
The previous Section demonstrates that the original GATT bargain combined relatively low levels of discipline or precommitment, e.g. multiple
escape clauses and a largely political enforcement procedure, with relatively
low levels of politics or participation, e.g. lack of formal ratification and
joint action by majority vote. One way to explain this early balance is selfreferential, pointing to the internal history or logic of either the law or politics pole. For example, as hinted at earlier, GATT law was probably soft
because of a general aversion amongst negotiators of strict legalism, the
clublike atmosphere of the early GATT days, and the prevailing idea of embedded liberalism that permitted flexibility and room for domestic
maneuvering. That GATT decisionmaking, in turn, required relatively low
levels of politics or participation such as that required by a simple majority
could also be explained internally within the politics or voice pole. Tariff
negotiations, the central part of the GATT, are a highly technical, low politics exercise more easily left to experts. Those experts, in turn, were quite
content to operate in a businesslike fashion, estranged from politics and
amenable to rapid reactions in changed circumstances. As a result, they were
Article XXV could be taken by one-fourth of the membership (that is, even if only half of the membership is present, half of those present and casting a vote can still adopt decisions).
51. Cf. EEC Treaty, supra note 48, art. 235 (requiring unanimity). As John Jackson noted in
1969: “[L]ooking at the language of [GATT Article XXV] . . . without considering preparatory
history, practice, or circumstances, one might conclude that sweeping obligations concerning trade
could be entered into by a majority of the contracting parties and be made binding upon other members, even those not voting for the proposal.” Jackson, supra note 33, at 127.
52. Note, however, that Article XXX:2 puts a potential break on the possibility for countries
to opt out of GATT amendments: “The CONTRACTING PARTIES may decide that any amendment . . . is of such a nature that any contracting party which has not accepted it within a period
specified . . . shall be free to withdraw from this Agreement, or to remain a contracting party with
the consent of the CONTRACTING PARTIES.” GATT, supra note 5, art. XXX:2.
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able to agree to majority voting. Yet, in my view, a crucial factor explaining
the equilibrium found in the original GATT text is not internal or selfreferential to either the law or politics axis. Rather, it relates to the bidirectional interaction between the two poles.
First, how did GATT manage so successfully to reduce tariff levels and
how could negotiators possibly agree to simple majority voting rules, that is,
such low levels of participation or voice? In the E.C., for example, it took
decades to shift to majority voting and even then only for limited fields and
53
pursuant to some super majority, not a simple majority. In my view, it is
the GATT’s weak legal-normative structure, i.e., its low level of discipline
and many exit options, that explains GATT’s early success and majority voting rules. Is it not logical that when countries know that if worst comes to
worst exit from obligations is possible, they will more easily make commitments? And that they will, moreover, not bother too much about how new
rules are created nor even mind that their voice, protest, or veto may get lost
in a majority voting procedure? In other words, when levels of discipline or
precommitment are low and obligations are not rigidly enforced, is it not
normal that countries make broader and deeper commitments and more eas54
ily agree to future decisionmaking by majority vote? Any new rule that
would emerge against their will can, in any event, still be exited from thanks
to the thinness of the legal-normative structure. A similar balance was struck
55
in the United Nations (“U.N.”) Charter.
Second, how can one explain the low levels of discipline, many escape
clauses, weak remedies, and essentially political enforcement mechanism of
56
GATT 1947, all of which deviate from general international law? Conversely, and here is the bidirectional or even circular force of the law-andpolitics narrative, the GATT’s low levels of politics and participation, e.g.
lack of formal ratification and majority-voting rules, explain the low levels
of discipline and multiple exit options under the original GATT, e.g. the existing legislation clause and weak dispute process. Indeed, when faced with
low levels of politics, participation, and contestation, including a system of
easy, majority-based decisionmaking, is it not normal that countries insisted
on escape clauses and a hard law enforcement mechanism was seen as undesirable? Given the inherent risk of being outvoted in the creation of new
53. Paul Craig & Gráinne de Búrca, E.U. Law: Text, Cases, and Materials 153–55
(3d ed. 2003).
54. As Jackson pointed out, “nations often can simply violate the [GATT] obligations or
CONTRACTING PARTY decisions without the fear of much penalty . . . . Since Article XXV is so
loosely and broadly drafted, it may be that a very important escape valve and check upon the
CONTRACTING PARTIES’ power is the practical ability of most states to refuse to obey GATT.”
Jackson, supra note 33, at 127–28.
55. Compare U.N. Charter art. 18 (stating that U.N. General Assembly resolutions are not
legally binding, hence countries could agree to their adoption by majority vote), with U.N. Charter
art. 27 (stating that U.N. Security Council resolutions are legally binding, hence countries, at least
the most powerful ones, required a veto).
56. See Pauwelyn, supra note 43 (stating that standard international law imposes cessation of
breach and reparation).
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rules and the uncertainties of the future, such as shifts in supply and demand, technological advances, election cycles, changes in political
majorities, and domestic social preferences, could it not be expected that
negotiators would be averse to strong rule-enforcement, and want to keep
57
certain exit options open?
In sum, because of low levels of law or discipline in the form of escape
clauses and weak dispute settlement, the low levels of politics or participation, such as majority voting, became digestible and could be sustained. At
the same time, because of low levels of participation or politics, only relatively low levels of discipline or law could be agreed to and only such low
levels were manageable.
B. GATT’s Quiet Mutation (1947–1994)
Departing from an early balance between low discipline and low participation, as soon as GATT became operational, the original equilibrium
gradually shifted toward more discipline and harder law, including less exit,
and more participation or politics, including more demands for voice. This
occurred piecemeal and over time, hence the reference to GATT’s quiet mutation. It demonstrates the living, dynamic interaction between law and
politics, exit and voice. A change on one side of the spectrum, however
small, necessarily affects the other.
1. More Law: From a Political Enforcement
Process to Gradual Legalization
That GATT’s legal-normative structure gradually thickened is well
documented. As pointed out earlier, most discussions of the evolution of the
58
world trade system focus on just that. On substance, seven rounds of tariff
negotiations dramatically reduced import duties on industrial goods and in
1979 the Tokyo Round Codes expanded GATT discipline to include the far
59
more sensitive field of nontariff barriers as well. Moreover, whilst in the
text of GATT, the enforcement mechanism was part and parcel of the political structure, over time GATT’s dispute process was detached from
mainstream decisionmaking. At an early stage GATT parties, rather than
making rulings themselves within the diplomatic process, referred Article
XXIII complaints to a so-called Working Party. This was a smaller group of

57. See George W. Downs & David M. Rocke, Optimal Imperfection? Domestic Uncertainty and Institutions in International Relations 100 (1995); Ian R. Macneil,
Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical and Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw. U. L. Rev. 854 (1978); Alan O. Sykes, Protectionism as a
‘‘Safeguard’’: A Positive Analysis of the GATT ‘‘Escape Clause’’ with Normative Speculations, 58 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 255 (1991).
58.

See supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text.

59. The Tokyo Round Codes dealt with government procurement, technical standards, customs valuation, aircraft, import licensing procedures, anti-dumping, and subsidies.
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countries, generally including the principal actors in the dispute as well as a
number of interested parties and so-called “neutrals.” The countries in the
Working Party discussed, negotiated, and eventually voted on the questions
before them and, when successful in reaching some agreement (albeit one
imposed by majority vote), recommended a way forward to the GATT
membership, which, in turn, adopted or declined to adopt the recommenda60
tion under the Article XXV majority voting rule. Soon the number of
neutrals exceeded the number of interested parties and the Working Party
process transformed from a purely diplomatic exercise to a modified form of
61
third-party adjudication. The next step was to replace the Working Party
with a so-called “panel” made up exclusively of neutral countries before
62
which the disputing parties would plead their case, and later composed of
63
individuals acting in their own, individual capacity. With the establishment
of “panels”—a word derived from the term “panel of experts,” evoking notions of technical expertise and impartiality—the role and input of the
GATT Secretariat increased. Highlighting the increased focus on an objective application of the rules, rather than an evaluation of the political
sensitivities at stake, in 1981 the GATT, for the first time in its history, es64
tablished a legal office.
After the conclusion of the Tokyo Round in 1979, GATT parties further
streamlined and legalized the dispute process. In 1980, they adopted the
Agreed Description of Customary Practice and an Understanding on Dispute
65
Settlement. In 1982, a Ministerial Declaration issued recommendations on
how to make GATT adjudication more effective to include expediting the
process, strengthening the role of the GATT Secretariat, calling for clearer
66
decisions and recommendations, and clarifying the implementation stage.
In a 1984 decision, important improvements were made in the procedures

60.

Hudec, Diplomacy, supra note 19, at 75–78.

61. The Australian Subsidy case (complaint by Chile) was a trendsetter in this respect. See
Report Adopted by the CONTRACTING PARTIES, Australia—Subsidy on Ammonium Sulphate (Apr.
3, 1950), GATT B.I.S.D. (2d Supp.) at 188 (1952) [hereinafter the Australian Subsidy case].
62. The first such panel was created at the Seventh Session of GATT contracting parties, in
1952. Interestingly, it was set up to deal with all complaints raised during that session, not just one
particular dispute. Summary Record of the Fifth Meeting, GATT Doc. SR.7/5, at 6 (Oct. 13, 1952)
(recommending establishment of panel); Summary Record of the Seventh Meeting, GATT Doc.
SR.7/7, at 7–9 (Oct. 18, 1952) (determining composition of panel).
63. See Summary Record of the Seventh Meeting, GATT Doc. SR.9/7 at 6 (Nov. 5, 1954);
Hudec, Diplomacy, supra note 19 at 90.
64. Robert E. Hudec, Enforcing International Trade Law: The Evolution of the
Modern GATT Legal System 70–71 (1993) [hereinafter Hudec, Evolution].
65. Understanding regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Surveillance (Nov. 28, 1979), GATT B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) at 210–19 (1980); see also Robert E. Hudec,
GATT Dispute Settlement after the Tokyo Round: An Unfinished Business, 13 Cornell Int’l L.J.
145 (1980).
66.
(1983).

Ministerial Declaration, L/5424 (Nov. 29, 1982), GATT B.I.S.D. (29th Supp.) at 9, 10
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67

for panel selection. In a 1988 midterm agreement in the context of the new
68
Uruguay Round, further procedural rules were set out.
2. More Politics: From Majority Voting to a Consensus Practice
As described earlier, the actual text of GATT opened the door for
surprisingly low levels of participation or politics; in particular, joint GATT
action by simple majority and relatively flexible amendment rules. In 1948,
69
for example, Part II of the GATT was amended with less than unanimity. In
1959 GATT parties adopted a recommendation on freedom of contract in
70
transport insurance by majority decision. When granting waivers and
deciding on the accession of new countries, GATT parties traditionally
71
voted, each decision requiring just two-thirds of the votes cast. Equally,
most results of the various GATT trade negotiation rounds were accepted by
only a fraction of GATT parties. They were implemented through tariff
protocols amending the GATT under the two-thirds majority rule, or separate
72
side agreements such as the Tokyo Round Codes on nontariff issues. In this
multiple-speed GATT, most developing countries steered away from
additional obligations, in particular the Tokyo Round Codes, and even
73
obtained exemptions from existing GATT provisions.

67. Dispute Settlement Procedures, L/5752, GATT B.I.S.D. (31st Supp.) at 9, 9–10 (1985). A
roster of nongovernmental individuals for use on panels was set up and the Director General was
given the power to appoint panel members in case the parties disagreed.
68. Improvements to the GATT Dispute Settlement Rules and Procedures, L/6489 (Apr. 12,
1989), GATT B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) at 61–67 (1990).
69. Summary Record of Thirteenth Meeting, GATT Doc. GATT/1/SR.13, at 5 (Mar. 23,
1948) (discussing two-thirds requirement for amendment).
70. Freedom of Contract in Transport Insurance (May 27, 1959), GATT B.I.S.D. (8th Supp.)
at 26 (1960); Summary Record of the Ninth Meeting, GATT Doc. SR.14/9, at 15 (Jun. 9, 1959)
(providing details of vote).
71.

GATT, supra note 5, arts. XXV:5, XXXIII; see Jackson, supra note 33, at 122.

72.

See Roessler, supra note 48, at 79.

73. In 1964, Part IV on Trade and Development was added to GATT. Protocol Amending the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade to Introduce a Part IV on Trade and Development, GATT
B.I.S.D. (13th Supp.) at 2 (1965). The crucial element in Part IV was the abandonment of the basic
GATT principle of reciprocity or balance of concessions as it applies to the relation between developed and developing countries. Furthermore, first through a 1971 waiver, Generalized System of
Preferences, L/3545 (June 25, 1971), GATT B.I.S.D. (18th Supp.) at 24 (1972), and then permanently in 1979 (the so-called Enabling Clause, Differential and More Favorable Treatment:
Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries, L/4903 (Nov. 28, 1979), GATT
B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) at 203 (1980) [hereinafter Differential and More Favorable Treatment]), developing countries obtained approval for major deviations from another cornerstone of the GATT
system: the principle of non-discrimination. Most importantly, developed countries were now permitted to grant tariff preferences to developing countries without having to extend them to the
developed world.
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At the same time, voting soon became the exception and consensus
decisionmaking the rule. In 1955, for example, GATT parties adopted, by
75
consensus, resolutions on investment for economic development, the dis76
77
posal of surplus products, and the liquidation of strategic stocks. In 1979,
a number of the Tokyo Round results were implemented by decisionmaking
under Article XXV—including the so-called Enabling Clause in favor of
78
developing countries—each time by consensus. In the majority of cases,
prior to formal meetings an agreement was worked out. Only subsequently
was a decision taken and this mostly by consensus as interpreted by the
Chairman, that is, in the absence of a formal objection from any contracting
party present on the floor (to be distinguished from unanimity of all par79
ties). This consensus practice guaranteed higher levels of participation and
voice than the majority-voting rule on the books. Each GATT party could
make its voice heard, a voice that was, at least on paper, the same for each
party pursuant to the one-member-one-vote rule. Moreover, under the consensus rule, each GATT party could threaten a veto, a risk that increased
debate, contestation, and participation and, in short, amplified the level of
80
politics in the decisionmaking process.
Although gradually legalized and extracted from the political process,
crucial decisions in GATT dispute settlement—such as panel establishment
and the adoption of panel rulings—followed this general trend. Like other
decisions under Article XXV, they gradually required consensus, instead of
simple majority. In theory, this granted each GATT party the right to veto or
81
block progress in the dispute process. Unlike the impression sometimes
74. For exceptions, see the vote in 1985 in favor of holding a special GATT session to launch
the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations and the vote in 1990 on a waiver for the German Democratic Republic’s trade preferences to the former Soviet Bloc countries, both reported in Claus-Dieter
Ehlermann & Lothar Ehring, Decision-Making in the World Trade Organization: Is the Consensus
Practice of the World Trade Organization Adequate for Making, Revising and Implementing Rules
on International Trade?, 8 J. Int’l Econ. L. 51, 61 (2005).
75. See International Investment for Economic Development (Mar. 4, 1955), GATT B.I.S.D.
(3d Supp.) at 49 (1955).
76.
77.
(1955).
78.

See Disposal of Surpluses (Mar. 4, 1955), GATT B.I.S.D. (3d Supp.) at 50 (1955).
See Liquidation of Strategic Stocks (Mar. 4, 1955), GATT B.I.S.D. (3d Supp.) at 51
Differential and More Favorable Treatment, supra note 73, at 203.

79. As a former legal adviser to GATT concluded, “[t]here is no instance in the history of the
GATT in which the Contracting Parties have used their powers under Article XXV:1 to impose new
policy obligations [to be distinguished from non-binding recommendations] on contracting parties
unwilling to accept them.” Roessler, supra note 48, at 79.
80. The informal nature of the consensus practice also permitted giving a voice to countries
that were only provisional or de facto GATT parties. Those countries were also actively participating
in the decisionmaking process without much regard for their formal lack of a vote. Jackson, supra
note 33, at 123.
81. A 1982 Ministerial Declaration, Ministerial Declaration, GATT B.I.S.D. (29th Supp.) at
9, 10 (1983), explicitly confirmed, for the very first time, the consensus principle for any decision
by GATT parties in dispute settlement. The subsequent 1988 midterm agreement, in somewhat
ambiguous terms, took away the veto for the establishment of panels but confirmed the veto for the
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created by WTO commentators, however, in most GATT disputes such
82
blocking did not materialize, and the adoption of Working Party and panel
83
reports occurred by consensus, often with little discussion. It was only in
the late 1980s and especially the early 1990s that the possibility of vetoing
progress in the GATT dispute mechanism led to serious foot-dragging,
blocking, refusals to conform to panel rulings, and non-authorized retalia84
tions. In other words, over time, GATT dispute settlement was not
uniformly legalized, as witnessed by neutral panels and an increased role for
the Secretariat, and some aspects of it actually became more and more political, in particular panel establishment and adoption.
3. GATT’s Quiet Mutation as a Bidirectional Interaction
Between Law and Politics
Like the low levels of discipline and participation in the text of GATT
1947, the gradual thickening of the GATT’s normative structure toward
more discipline or law and the increased politicization in its decisionmaking
toward more participation and contestation, including a move to a consensus
practice, can be explained on the basis of self-referential factors, internal to
either the law or politics pole. On the law or discipline side, for example, the
legalization of dispute settlement could be explained by a mounting belief in
the rule of law amongst GATT parties and GATT panelists alike and the resulting conviction that third-party adjudication is the best and fairest method
for dispute resolution. In addition, the stricter enforcement of GATT can be
explained as a necessary feature to maintain support for trade liberalization.
With tariffs gradually reduced, GATT had to tackle nontariff barriers such as
environmental or health standards, antidumping duties, and subsidies, which
adoption of panel rulings and authorizations to suspend concessions. Improvements to the GATT
Dispute Settlement Rules and Procedures, L/6489 (Apr. 12 1989), GATT B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) at
61, 63 ¶¶ F(a), G(3).
82. The very first time in GATT history that a defendant blocked the establishment of a panel
occurred only in 1972 in the U.S.-E.C. Compensatory Taxes on Imports case. Hudec, Evolution,
supra note 64, at 54. Even then, the reason was not some systemic objection to GATT deciding the
dispute, but rather that the tax in question would be abolished the same year, a promise that the E.C.
eventually kept. Id. at 453–54. The adoption of panel reports had only been vetoed once in GATT
history up to 1986, namely in the very contentious 1976 DISC case between the U.S. and the E.C.
See id. at 46. Even there the report was eventually adopted, albeit only five years later. United States
Tax Legislation, L/4422 (Nov. 2, 1976), GATT B.I.S.D. (23d Supp.) at 98–114 (1977) (describing
the report); Hudec, Evolution, supra note 64, at 456 (detailing its later adoption).
83. Hudec, Diplomacy, supra note 19, at 80 (discussing the Australian Subsidy case, supra
note 61); id. at 89 (remarking that the substance of reports of the Seventh Session Panel were not
even debated).
84. In the politically charged report United States—Imports of Sugar from Nicaraugua,
L/5607 (Mar. 13, 1984), GATT B.I.S.D. (31st Supp.) at 67–74 (1985), the U.S. refused to defend the
complaint in GATT, but did not block the process. Once adopted, however, the U.S. announced that
it had no intention of complying with the panel ruling. Hudec, Evolution, supra note 64, at 176,
513. Both the Pasta and Citrus panel rulings were blocked by the E.C. The U.S. then retaliated in
the Citrus case by increasing tariffs on E.C. pasta imports, thereby linking the two cases. The E.C.
counter-retaliated with higher tariffs on U.S. lemon and walnut imports. The year after, the parties
reached a settlement in both cases. Id. at 493, 502.
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were increasingly used to circumvent tariff commitments. This exercise
proved far more contentious, stirring the attention of democratic politics,
and required more open-ended rules. To obtain a minimum of compliance
with the new disciplines, which were much harder to monitor and enforce, a
stronger enforcement mechanism was needed.
Equally, the consensus practice and general increase in the levels of
politics and contestation in GATT affairs has explanations self-contained
within the politics pole. The 1960s marked the beginning of a gradual erosion of the clublike GATT, centered on an expert consensus on how to
85
improve postwar trade relations. Deep substantive disagreements came into
the open due to a stream of new and extremely diverse GATT members—in
86
particular, the E.C., Japan, and newly independent, developing countries —
and the emergence of novel trade problems for which the original GATT did
87
not provide a blueprint—in particular, nontariff barriers. In this new context, levels of contestation and politics rose naturally and consensus
decisionmaking became a necessity if everyone was to be kept on board.
Although the above internal explanations elucidate much of the GATT’s
quiet mutation, in my view, they miss a key factor. This key factor resides
not on either side of the law-politics spectrum but in the interaction between
the two poles. In the same way that low discipline and low participation mutually supported each other in the original GATT text, during the GATT’s
forty-seven years of operation, gradually increasing levels of politics, participation, and contestation enabled, and were the consequence of,
progressive levels of discipline or law. More politics enabled more law. In
turn, more law required more politics.
On the one hand—and perhaps most importantly—the higher levels of
contestation and politics in the decisionmaking process—in particular, the
85.

See Hudec, Diplomacy, supra note 19, at 67.

86. The E.C. replaced six key GATT parties with one new economic superpower whose
goals and commercial policies were not part of the ITO/GATT heritage. Id. at 209. The E.C. was,
according to many, concerned more with creating its own internal market than with liberalizing
world trade. Japan’s rapid economic growth led to GATT membership in 1955, introducing another
key player that was not part of the early ITO/GATT consensus and had yet another perspective on
trade matters. Finally, thanks to decolonization, a steady stream of developing countries joined the
GATT, most of them through simple sponsorship by their former colonial master. From its original
twenty-three signatories, the GATT expanded to 100 participants in 1973, the increase made up
almost entirely of developing countries. See id.
87. New topics emerged on GATT’s agenda, both because of the new membership and because of the replacement of the early postwar problems, which had gradually been resolved, with
new questions of world trade around which no easy consensus emerged, namely: the creation of the
E.C. (and the discrimination and new trade restrictions that came with it), the worsening trade position of the developing countries (and the call for special economic development exceptions), the
radical effects of postwar agricultural programs, and the emerging industrial competition from the
non-Western world, especially in the field of textiles. Hudec, Diplomacy, supra note 19, at 209.
More generally, whilst six rounds of tariff negotiations had reduced the average level of customs
duties between the major developed countries to levels approaching commercial insignificance
(under ten percent), id. at 214–15, new protectionism emerged in the form of so-called nontariff
barriers (ranging from quotas and import licenses to technical standards and antidumping restrictions). To define and reduce protectionist nontariff barriers proved much more difficult than making
tariff reductions.
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consensus rule and effective veto power for each GATT party—enabled the
thickening of the GATT’s legal-normative structure, including the legalization of its enforcement regime. Indeed, if GATT parties have full control,
including veto power, over the creation of GATT rules as well as the adoption of GATT panel rulings, why would they fear the legalization of the
GATT system? In this sense, higher levels of politics as seen in the consensus practice explain GATT’s increase in law through the legalization of the
dispute process. It was the consensus practice that made GATT legalization
acceptable and digestible to GATT parties. On the other hand—and here
again is the bidirectional or even circular interaction between law and politics—GATT legalization called for and cemented the need for more politics,
participation, and contestation, including the GATT consensus practice. Faced
with the gradual legalization of GATT dispute settlement, is it not normal that
GATT parties became more aware of and sensitive to how GATT rules were
88
made and how GATT rulings were adopted? In particular, is it not logical
that when rules are enforced and become more real, countries make sure that
no rule passes the political process without their consent, hence the consensus practice?
C. The WTO Eruption (1994–2004)
In the previous Section, I referred to the changes that took place in the
world trade system from 1947 to 1994 as a silent mutation. In this Section, I
put the creation of the WTO in perspective, calling it an eruption rather than
a big bang that in one instant transformed the trade system. My view, in
other words, is that often the transformation that took place in the fortyseven-year operation of GATT is underestimated, while that of the creation
of the WTO is somewhat overblown. In the previous Section, I elaborated on
the incremental, but overall crucial changes that occurred in the world trade
system from 1947 to 1994. The creation of the WTO can only be understood, and was only made possible, in the context of those multiple but less
visible mutations. It is to the changes that occurred with the creation of the
WTO that I now turn.
1. Drastic Increase in Discipline and Law
The WTO treaty significantly thickened the trade system’s legalnormative structure. To begin with, almost fifty years after the failed ITO, a
true international organization emerged with legal personality and an almost
88.

As Weiler put it in the context of the E.C.’s evolution:

The “harder” the law in terms of its binding effect both on and within states, the less willing states
are to give up their prerogative to control the emergence of such law or the law’s “opposability”
to them. When the international law is “real,” when it is “hard” in the sense of being binding
not only on but also in states, and when there are effective legal remedies to enforce it, decisionmaking suddenly becomes important, indeed crucial.

Weiler, supra note 16, at 34.
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universal membership of close to 150 countries. A host of new substantive
agreements, GATS, TRIPS, SPS, and TBT, were adopted and became binding on all WTO members pursuant to the single-package approach. With
few exceptions, the multiple-speed GATT came to a halt and was transposed
into a uniform WTO. Also, dispute settlement was streamlined. Most importantly, the right to veto the establishment of panels or the adoption of
dispute rulings was taken away. To block the process, a so-called negative
consensus of all members is now needed, making the process virtually
89
automatic. In addition, the creation of a new, standing Appellate Body to
hear appeals against panel rulings added significant weight to the independence and further legalization of the enforcement branch. Unlike GATT
Article XXIII, which focused on maintaining a mere balance of concessions,
the DSU for the first time, albeit implicitly, imposes a legally binding obli90
gation to comply with WTO rules and WTO dispute rulings. Crucially, the
DSU not only increased the level of discipline imposed on reluctant defendants (read: the E.C., which had blocked the GATT process in a number of
cases brought by the United States). It also limited the exit options of what
could be called aggressive complainants (read: the United States, which
previously pursued certain GATT rights unilaterally under § 301 of the 1974
Trade Act). Article 23 of the DSU obliges all WTO members to submit their
WTO complaints to the WTO and not to pursue them unilaterally. In other
words, complainants unhappy with the progress or result in WTO dispute
settlement can no longer exit the WTO system and revert to self-help.
The strengthening of the trade system’s normative structure was confirmed in the first ten years of the WTO’s operation. Close to 350 dispute
91
proceedings were started and in all cases in which a panel was requested, it
was established, notwithstanding the objections of defendants in certain
92
cases. Similarly, in all cases in which a panel or Appellate Body ruling was
circulated, it was adopted, even if the losers had major problems with the

89.

See supra note 6.

90. Trade compensation and reciprocal suspensions of concessions are explicitly defined as
temporary solutions only. DSU, supra note 4, art. 22.1. The ultimate objective of the DSU is,
thereby, either settlement or compliance. Paying compensation or suffering trade retaliation can no
longer end a dispute. See John H. Jackson, International Law Status of WTO Dispute Settlement
Reports: Obligation to Comply or Option to ‘Buy Out’?, 98 Am. J. Int’l L. 109 (2004); John H.
Jackson, The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding—Misunderstandings on the Nature of Legal
Obligation, 91 Am. J. Int’l L. 60 (1997); Pauwelyn, supra note 43. But see Judith Hippler Bello,
The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding: Less is More, 90 Am. J. Int’l L. 416 (1996); Warren
F. Schwartz & Alan O. Sykes, The Economic Structure of Renegotiation and Dispute Resolution in
the World Trade Organization, 31 J. Legal Stud. S179 (2002).
91. See World Trade Organization, Dispute Settlement, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/
dispu_e/dispu_e.htm (last visited July 27, 2005).
92. See, in particular, the Cuban Liberty and Solidarity Act dispute, in which the U.S. threatened not to attend panel meetings. Chairman of the Board, United States—The Cuban Liberty and
Solidarity Act, U.N. Doc. WT/DS38/5 (Apr. 25, 1997) (communication from the Chairman of the
Panel), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_status_e.htm#1996. The
case was subsequently settled.
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93

results. Illustrating the closure of exit for aggressive complainants, a crucial WTO panel ruled that core aspects of § 301 of the U.S. Trade Act were
not in violation of DSU requirements, albeit, only because the United States
solemnly promised not to seek redress of its WTO rights inconsistently with
94
the multilateral track imposed by the DSU. Apart from a few borderline
situations, the United States has, indeed, no longer reverted to the unilateral
95
enforcement of its WTO rights. From the perspective of other WTO members, especially the weaker ones, this is a remarkable achievement. The new
Appellate Body, in turn, streamlined panel case law and, like more conventional judicial bodies, has opted for a rigorous, impartial, and strictly legal
96
approach to analyzing trade complaints. It also placed WTO rules squarely
within the broader field of public international law, thereby confirming their
97
legally binding nature.
2. Modest but Important Increase in Participation and Politics
Along with the creation of the WTO, crucial although less visible and
noted changes also were implemented on the politics or participation pole.
Importantly, for the first time ever, the WTO Agreement explicitly confirmed that “[t]he WTO shall continue the practice of decisionmaking by
98
consensus followed under GATT 1947.” This confirmation—in deviation
from the simple-majority voting rule in GATT Article XXV—offers stricter
guarantees of participation and voice than a mere consensus practice developed over time. It cements the veto right of each and every WTO member.
At the same time, the old majority-voting rule of GATT Article XXV was
not entirely taken off the books; if, but only if, a decision cannot be arrived
93. See, for example, the controversial ruling in Report of the Appellate Body, European
Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-containing Products, U.N. Doc.
WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001) [hereinafter E.C.—Asbestos], or the decision to grant a retroactive remedy in the Australia—Leather dispute against the request of the complainant (U.S.) itself.
Report of the Panel, Australia—Subsidies Provided to Producers and Exporters of Automotive
Leather, U.N. Doc. WT/DS126/RW (Jan. 21, 2000). Both rulings were adopted.
94. Report of the Panel, United States—Sections 301–310 of the Trade Act of 1974, U.N. Doc.
WT/DS152/R (Jan. 27, 2000).
95. See, for example, the E.C.—Bananas case, in which the U.S. imposed sanctions even
before it had obtained WTO authorization. Report of the Appellate Body, European Communities—
Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, U.N. Doc. WT/DS27/AB/R (Sept. 9,
1997) [hereinafter E.C.—Bananas]. This ruling was condemned in the U.S.—Certain Products case.
Report of the Appellate Body, United States—Countervailing Measures Concerning Certain Products from the European Communities, U.N. Doc. WT/DS212/AB/R (Dec. 9, 2002).
96. See Robert Howse, Global Governance by Judiciary: The WTO Experiment
with Appellate Review (forthcoming Nov. 2005).
97. See Pauwelyn, supra note 43; Joost Pauwelyn, The Role of Public International Law in
the WTO: How Far Can We Go?, 95 Am. J. Int’l L. 535 (2001).
98. WTO Agreement, supra note 3, art. IX:1. A consensus is defined as a situation in which
“no Member, present at the meeting when the decision is taken, formally objects to the proposed
decision.” Id. art. IX:1 n.1. Article XVI:1 confirms the importance of GATT practice: “Except as
otherwise provided . . . the WTO shall be guided by the decisions, procedures and customary practice followed by the CONTRACTING PARTIES to GATT 1947.” Id. art. XVI:1.
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at by consensus, the matter can be decided by voting. The WTO Agreement did, however, introduce higher majority rules—ensuring higher levels
of participation or voice—for specific decisions (to be resorted to, however,
only if no consensus can be reached). A waiver now requires a three-fourths
100
majority of all WTO members or in some cases even consensus, in contrast to GATT 1947 which merely required a two-thirds majority of votes
101
actually cast. The adoption of an authoritative interpretation of WTO rules
102
now requires a three-fourths majority of all WTO members, in contrast to
the GATT 1947 practice of adoption by simple majority of votes cast pursu103
ant to Article XXV.
Besides embracing stricter decisionmaking rules, the WTO Agreement
also reined in the scope of joint action by WTO members. Whilst under
GATT Article XXV contracting parties had the power to meet and decide
“with a view to facilitating the operation and furthering the objectives of
104
[GATT],” Article IX of the WTO Agreement on decisionmaking does not
confer any powers to WTO organs beyond those explicitly granted elsewhere in the treaty, such as Article XII on accessions or the DSU on dispute
settlement. As a result, WTO organs, such as the Ministerial Conference or
General Council, no longer have the broad-ranging competence of deciding
matters to facilitate the operation or further the objectives of the WTO
treaty. Although the broad powers in GATT Article XXV were only occasionally exercised, this change represents an important cutback on the
powers of the GATT/WTO.
Finally, the rules to amend the WTO treaty were tightened, thereby
ensuring, once again, higher levels of participation. Instead of the two-thirds
majority required for most amendments under GATT 1947, the WTO
105
Agreement explicitly confirms the consensus practice. Although the
fallback rule of a two-thirds majority continues to apply in many cases when
106
no consensus can be reached, an increased number of amendments require

99.

Id. art. IX:1.

100. Id. art. IX:1 n.4 (stating that waivers of obligations subject to a transition period or a
period for staged implementation “shall be taken only by consensus”).
101.

Id. art. IX:3; GATT, supra note 5, art. XXV:5.

102.

WTO Agreement, supra note 3, art. IX:2.

103.

See Jackson, supra note 33, at 132–37.

104.

GATT, supra note 5, art. XXV:1.

105.

WTO Agreement, supra note 3, art. X:1.

106. Id. arts. X:1, :3, :5. WTO members not accepting the two-thirds majority amendment
remain unbound by the amendment unless the amendment is “of a nature that would not alter the
rights and obligations of the Members” (in which case the amendment is binding on all WTO members), id. art. X:4, or three-fourths of WTO members decide that either a member must accept the
amendment or it “shall be free to withdraw from the WTO or to remain a Member with the consent
of the Ministerial Conference,” WTO Agreement, supra note 3, arts. X:3, :5; see also GATT, supra
note 5, art. XXX:2.
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unanimity or consensus without fallback majority voting. In particular,
108
amendments to the DSU and the addition of new plurilateral agreements
109
to the WTO treaty require consensus of all WTO members. The latter
ensures the consent of all WTO members before the WTO adds a new
agreement to its mandate even if such new agreement is eventually not
binding on all WTO members. Put differently, a multiple-speed WTO is
thereby possible only with the consent of all WTO members.
Whilst the rules on the books might still leave some doubt as to the importance of consensus (in particular given the remaining fallback of simple
majority voting), the actual practice of WTO decisionmaking in its first ten
years of operation eradicates all doubts. WTO members have zealously protected the consensus rule, and are clearly determined to defend their veto
110
right and high levels of participation or voice. Apart from one decision on
111
the accession of Ecuador and a few close calls where some countries
112
pushed for a vote, in the first ten years of the WTO, no voting has taken
place, not even on waivers or the appointment of director-generals. All decisions were taken by consensus. Hence, notwithstanding the relatively light
fallback voting rules on the books—three-fourths for waivers and interpretations, simple majority for most other decisions—all WTO activity occurred
with the, albeit sometimes tacit, agreement of all WTO members. Although
developing countries make up three-fourths of the WTO membership, they
vehemently defended the consensus rule as well. As Lorand Bartels points
out, “[S]o anxious are developing countries about their position in the WTO
that both the Singapore and Doha Ministerial Declarations state expressly
that any decision to negotiate on new issues . . . must be taken on the basis
of explicit consensus. Mere silence [or a consensus decision not explicitly
113
objected to] is no longer sufficient.”

107. See GATS, supra note 7, art. II:1; TRIPS, supra note 7, art. 4; WTO Agreement, supra
note 3, art. X:2 (referring to WTO Agreement arts. IX and X); GATT, supra note 5, arts. I, II.
108.

WTO Agreement, supra note 3, art. X:8.

109.

WTO Agreement, supra note 3, art. X:9.

110. See, for example, the WTO Secretariat legal opinion that even the appointment of a
facilitator to assist in the resolution of the Brazil-U.S. cotton dispute under the WTO Subsidies
Agreement requires an “affirmative consensus.” Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of Meeting Held
in the Centre William Rappard on 15 April 2003, ¶¶ 68–72, U.N. Doc. WT/DSB/M/147 (July 1,
2003), criticized in Ehlermann & Ehring, supra note 74, at 8.
111. General Council Decision, Accession of Ecuador—Decision of 16 August 1995, n.1,
U.N. Doc. WT/ACC/ECU/5 (Aug. 22, 1995) (“This Decision was adopted by the General Council by
a two-thirds majority.”).
112. See E.C.—Bananas, supra note 95 (noting that the E.C. pushed for a vote against a U.S.
request for sanctions authorization). This was also reported in Ehlermann & Ehring, supra note 74,
at 64 nn.32–33. The contentious 1999 selection process for a new Director-General eventually led to
a split appointment of two individuals each for three years. General Council, Appointment of the
Next Director-General—Introductory Statement by Ambassador Ali Mchumo, Chairman of the General Council, U.N. Doc. WT/GC/26 (July 23, 1999).
113. Lorand Bartels, The Separation of Powers in the WTO: How to Avoid Judicial Activism,
53 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 861, 865 (2004).
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3. The WTO as a Bidirectional Interaction
Between Law and Politics
As was the case for the other two periods—the text of GATT 1947 and
the forty-seven years operation of GATT—the changes that took place with
the creation of the WTO can be explained in a self-referential manner, limited to either the law or the politics pole. For example, the monumental
closure of exit in the DSU is, one hopes, at least partially due to the highspirited belief in the rule of law cherished by many Uruguay Round negotiators. In particular, developing countries had long been supporters of
legalization as they hoped that a rules-based system, without political vetoes, would put them on a level playing field with more economically
114
powerful parties. Another, probably more important, internal reason that
explains the DSU revolution is of a blunter, realpolitik nature, namely a deal
between the United States, on the one hand, and most other countries (in
particular the E.C. and Japan), on the other. In exchange for automaticity in
the dispute process (that is, the E.C. and Japan relinquishing their veto
rights), the United States agreed to stop unilateral enforcement through
115
§ 301. Finally, the forty-seven years of GATT experience, in particular the
increasing difficulty of implementing trade agreements on nontariff measures such as the Tokyo Round codes, had taught a lesson: if the ambitious
Uruguay Round agreements were to be worth the paper they were written
on, they had to be backed up by a credible and effective dispute settlement
mechanism. Previous experience had shown that this had to include, eventually, the surrender of the veto right. For the GATT/WTO to be a way out of
the prisoner’s dilemma of trade policy, a credible enforcement mechanism
had to be in place to dissuade defectors. To outweigh the opposition to freer
trade, the supporters of the WTO had to be reassured that this time the concessions obtained would stick.
As with the other two periods, my claim is, however, that these internal
explanations miss a key factor. That key factor is encapsulated in the bidirectional interaction between law and politics. One of the main objectives of
this Article is to demonstrate that legal change occurs gradually, in tandem
with developments in the political process. The surrender of the veto right in
the new DSU was not a big bang that emerged out of the blue. Like the
116
magical date of 1992 in the E.C.’s transformation, the concessions in the

114. Julio Lacarte-Muró & Petina Gappah, Developing Countries and the WTO Legal and
Dispute Settlement System: A View from the Bench, 3 J. Int’l Econ. L. 395 (2000).
115. Hudec, Evolution, supra note 64, at 222–31, 237 (“Governments who preferred a
more cautious, more voluntary adjudication system had apparently persuaded themselves that the
risk of unchecked U.S. legal aggression was a greater danger than an excessively demanding GATT
legal system.”). For reasons why the European Community could conclude the DSU, see Theofanis
Christoforou, The World Trade Organization, Its Dispute Settlement System and the European Union: A Preliminary Assessment of Nearly Ten Years of Application, in L’Intégration Européenne
au XXIe Siècle: En Hommage à Jacques Bourrinet 257 (2004).
116.

See infra text accompanying note 141.
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DSU that still mystify international lawyers were indeed a landslide, but one
having its roots in a long history of smaller and bigger earthshocks. The veto
right was not written in the GATT itself. GATT provided, on the contrary,
for simple majority voting and the veto came about only gradually, first in117
voked as late as 1972, through subtle interactions between law and
politics. The surrender of the veto occurred through a similar incremental
process, closing off a major exit route, while injecting new levels of voice.
As expected under the law-and-politics paradigm, the closure of exit,
imposition of harder law, and general increase in discipline as found in automatic DSU procedures, as well as an obligation to follow the multilateral
DSU track, called for equally important inputs of politics or voice including
harder lawmaking. As squeezing a balloon on one side will automatically
inflate the other, squeezing exit options inflated the need for voice or participation. As a result, the WTO’s further legalization led quite naturally to
higher demands for voice or participation, including veto rights in the political decisionmaking process, higher fallback majority rules, and tougher
amendment provisions. Because WTO norms can now be enforced through
an automatic dispute process with limited exit options, control of the norm
itself, that is, at the time it is created, is the only possible solution for individual WTO members. This also explains why, to this date, WTO members
continue to defend zealously the consensus rule and carefully preserve their
veto right over any changes to the WTO bargain. As noted earlier, with one
exception, no WTO decision was taken by vote and all passed pursuant to
118
the consensus rule.
Crucially, this pressure for voice or participation at the state-party
level emerged with equal force for nonstate actors outside the WTO. The
former (state pressure) strengthened the system’s internal legitimacy; the
latter (nonstate actor pressure) questioned its external legitimacy. Because
trade obligations gradually moved from the dry, technical field of tariffs
to the hardcore political controversies of, for example, health and
environmental standards, the world trade system affected and drew the attention, protest, and voice not just of governmental trade elites and
businesses, but also of NGOs, consumers, and citizens at large. As
Keohane and Nye argued in the broader context of international economic
institutions:
[T]hese pressures on international institutions are, ironically, reflections of
their success. If international institutions were unimportant . . . no one
would care about their legitimacy. But it is now recognized that the policies of the IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO make a difference. Hence
they are judged not only on the quality of the results that these policies

117.

See supra note 82.

118.

See supra text accompanying note 111.
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yield, but also on the procedures through which the policies are devel119
oped.

Put differently, because the WTO matters—in the words of the Appellate
Body, it is about “the real world where people live and work and die”—and
its rules are real in that exit options are reduced, questions of international
governance and legitimacy arise. This was not the case in respect of GATT
1947, which focused on tariffs, with multiple options to exit. Nor are legitimacy and democratic deficit hot topics at institutions that the public
continues to perceive as largely technical, such as the International Telecommunications Union (“ITU”) or the World Meteorological Organization
(“WMO”). The same applies for organizations that, like GATT 1947, have a
weak enforcement mechanism, even if they deal with high political topics
and decide by majority vote. Such an institution is the U.N. General Assembly, whose resolutions are not legally binding and hence do not attract the
120
same levels of contestation and voice.
Conversely—and here again is the bidirectional (even circular) force of
the law-and-politics narrative—it was not only the increase in discipline or
law that enhanced the need for politics or participation. The reverse was also
true: countries could only accept the dramatic increase in legalization and
digest the automatic and compulsory enforcement of WTO obligations under the new DSU once they were reassured that, in the political process, no
121
new obligations could arise without their consent. It is this enhanced
voice, or participation in the political process, that gave WTO members the
confidence to engage in the revolutionary transformation of the dispute
122
process and to accept it with relative equanimity.

119. Robert O. Keohane & Joseph E. Nye, Jr., The Club Model of Multilateral Cooperation
and Problems of Democratic Legitimacy, in Efficiency, Equity, and Legitimacy: The Multilateral Trading System at the Millennium 272 (Roger B. Porter et al. eds., 2001).
120. See supra note 55. Eric Stein, after reviewing four intergovernmental organizations “confirms the correlation between the level of integration (normative-institutional and empirical-social),
on the one hand, and the intensity of the discourse on the democracy-legitimacy deficit, on the
other.” Eric Stein, International Integration and Democracy: No Love at First Sight, 95 Am. J. Int’l
L. 489, 530 (2001).
121.

As Weiler explains in the Community context:

Instead of a simple (legal) cause and (political) effect, this subtler process was a circular one.
On this reading, the deterioration of the political supranational decisional procedures [in the
WTO, the consensus-based, inefficient rulemaking procedures] . . . constituted the political
conditions that allowed the Member States to digest and accept the process of constitutionalization. Had no veto power existed, had intergovernmentalism not become the order of the day,
it is not clear to my mind that the Member States would have accepted with such equanimity
what the European Court was doing. They could accept the constitutionalization because they
took real control of the decisionmaking process, thus minimizing its threatening features.

Weiler, supra note 16, at 36.
122. It is, indeed, those increases in voice or participation (consensus decisionmaking and the
creation of a new Appellate Body that permits countries to voice their concern about panel rulings)
that John Jackson pointed to in his 1994 Congressional testimony when trying to convince the U.S.
Congress that the new WTO, and particularly the DSU, would not infringe U.S. sovereignty. John
Jackson, Testimony Prepared for the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, June 14, 1994, in
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In sum, higher levels of participation or politics at the WTO were not
only a consequence of further legalization; they were, at the same time, an
absolute precondition without which further legalization could not have
taken place. Put differently, as much as higher levels of law and discipline
increased the need for participation, voice, and politics, stronger outlets for
voice and more politics enabled and supported further legalization. The consensus rule in the political process, prevailing under this balance,
unmistakably led to a lourdeur in WTO decisionmaking. Viewed through
the law-and-politics paradigm, however, it was and remains the crucial factor: the price to be paid for an automatic and compulsory DSU. Without the
consensus rule and other reinforcements of politics, WTO members could
not have accepted and digested the dramatically more legalized WTO.
In this light, the WTO’s hard law combined with its hard lawmaking
process or, as most put it these days, the combination of a highly efficient
dispute process and a consensus-based, inefficient rulemaking procedure,
123
should no longer strike us as an “institutional paradox.” To the contrary,
this asymmetry can now be explained as a perfectly logical—although not
necessarily optimal—balance between high discipline or law and high par124
ticipation or politics. In addition, contrary to common perception, the
thicker normative structure of the trade system, although undoubtedly
strengthening the WTO, did not come at the expense of individual members.
On the contrary, through the consensus rule and related veto, the power of
individual members was strengthened. Legalization only materialized because of more—not less—politics (including consensus decisionmaking).

Government Printing Office, Hearings on the WTO and U.S. Sovereignty, reprinted in
The WTO as an International Organization 176 (Anne O. Krueger ed., 1998).
123.

See sources cited supra note 17.

124. From this perspective, the period of the creation and early years of the WTO is not unlike
what Joseph Weiler described as the “foundational period” of the European Community (from 1958,
the creation of the E.C., to the middle of the 1970s). Analyzing this early period, Weiler discovered
an apparent paradox similar to the now fashionable complaint heard in WTO circles about the imbalance between the WTO judiciary (fully automatic and compulsory) and the WTO political branch
(deadlocked by the consensus rule). He describes the paradox as follows:
[F]rom a legal-normative point of view, the Community developed in that first phase with an
inexorable dynamism of enhanced supranationalism. European legal integration moved powerfully ahead [especially with the adoption by the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) of core
Community doctrines, such as direct effect of Community law before domestic courts and supremacy of Community law over domestic law]. From a political-decisional-procedural point
of view, the very same period was characterized by a counter-development towards intergovernmentalism and away from European integration.

Weiler, supra note 16, at 16. Under the law-and-politics paradigm, the successful legal-normative
activity in this foundational period of the E.C. (spurred, in particular, by the ECJ) meant higher
levels of discipline or law, that is, “Community obligations, Community law, and Community policies were ‘for real.’ ” Id. at 30. More discipline and closure of exit from the Community system had
to increase the need for voice and participation. And so it happened. As Weiler recalls: “In what may
almost be termed a ruthless process, Member States took control over Community decisionmaking.”
Id. The best example of this “revenge by the Member States” was the legally dubious Luxembourg
Compromise whereby de facto each and every Member State could veto Community-proposed
legislation, notwithstanding the majority voting rules in the treaty itself.
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Similarly, further legalization required and could only be maintained with
more—not less—politics.
D. The Law-and-Politics Curve of the World Trade System
The law-and-politics narrative of the transformation from GATT to WTO
can now be summarized in Chart 1 below. The vertical axis (“politics”) represents levels of participation and contestation, and the flexibility, accountability
and input legitimacy that come with it. The horizontal axis (“law”) depicts
levels of discipline, precommitment, and legalization, and the rule of law and
welfare-enhancing trade liberalization that flow from it (both providing output
legitimacy). The diagonal curve depicts the trajectory of international organizations addressing subject matters that are politically sensitive and
contestable. At those “politically sensitive” organizations, deeper integration
requires more law and more politics. More discipline or law leads to more
participation or politics. As countries know that the rules are real, they want a
greater voice in their creation. Conversely, more participation or politics is
what permits and sustains the imposition of higher levels of discipline or law.
Without participation, contestation, and accountability, high levels of discipline or legalization in politically sensitive areas would not be digestible and
could not be sustained. The horizontal curve, in contrast, depicts the trajectory
of technical institutions such as the ITU or the WMO addressing low politics
questions that the public gladly leaves to expert decisions. This curve is horizontal, at a constant low level of politics or contestation. No matter how
strictly imposed or disciplined the organization’s rules, the level of politics or
participation remains the same (government by experts rather than government by representative politics). Depending on the technical or political nature
of the subject matters covered, the curve of an organization may be steeper
(more politically sensitive) or flatter (more technical) and, as happened with
the GATT, can change over time. Crucially, deviations to the left of the diagonal curve, representing too much politics and/or not enough discipline, risk an
ineffective organization such as the U.N. General Assembly (UNGA) or
GATT in the 1960s. Deviations to the right of the diagonal curve, representing
too much law or discipline and/or not enough politics or participation, risk an
unsupported organization such as the current WTO. Put differently, deviations
to the left may engender loyalty or input legitimacy but lack efficiency or output legitimacy (loyalty without efficiency). Deviations to the right, in contrast,
threaten a situation of efficiency without loyalty.
The text of GATT 1947 is best situated on the horizontal, “technical organizations” curve, somewhere to the right of the diagonal, “politically
sensitive organizations” curve (Point 1: “GATT 47”). As discussed earlier, the
original GATT was framed as a technical, expert-driven organization dealing
with low politics issues—tariffs—in a clublike, low-discipline fashion with a
lack of formal ratification, majority decisionmaking, many escape clauses,
and weak enforcement. In its early years of operation, however, the GATT
quickly shifted to higher levels of participation and politics, including
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decisionmaking by consensus, and somewhat higher levels of discipline, such
as relatively effective dispute settlement (Point 2: “GATT 50s”). Spurred by
the increasingly contested nature of its activities, including nontariff barriers,
and a steady flow of new and diverse members, the GATT gradually changed
tracks from the horizontal to the diagonal curve, from a technical to a more
politically sensitive organization. In the 1960s and early 1970s, the increased
levels of contestation and politics even brought the GATT to a temporary
125
standstill and a virtually dormant dispute process (Point 3: “GATT 60s”).
Thereafter, the organization, with renewed political impetus, continued its
gradual process of legalization and expansion of trade disciplines to arrive,
with the creation of the WTO, at a balance between relatively high levels of
politics and participation, as reflected in the consensus rule and global contestation of the organization, and dramatically increased levels of law and
discipline, illustrated by a single-package deal of over thirty agreements and a
compulsory dispute process (Point 4: “WTO 94”). As elaborated below, the
current situation after ten years of WTO is, however, one of too much discipline or law for the prevailing levels of participation and politics. As a
deviation to the right of the diagonal curve, the trade system thereby risks efficiency without loyalty.

Chart 1:
Law and Politics from GATT to WTO

125. See Hudec, Diplomacy, supra note 19, at 209–10 (“In one situation after another the
rules could not be enforced and were put aside. Formal renegotiation was attempted in a few areas,
but for the most part the old rules were simply allowed to lapse while parties searched for whatever
ad hoc settlement could be found.”).
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II. The Threat of a WTO Fortress
Part I of this Article told and explained the story of the transformation of
world trade using the alternative law-and-politics narrative instead of the
conventional from-politics-to-law approach. Through this lens three distinct
periods were discerned: the creation of the text of GATT 1947, the operation
of GATT (1947–1994) and the WTO (1994–2004). My central claim was
that for all three periods a crucial explanatory factor was the bidirectional,
even circular, interaction between law and politics, discipline, and participation. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the system did not evolve from trade
politics to trade law. Rather, both the level of law and the level of politics
gradually increased. More politics enabled more law. More law required
more politics. While both trends were continually present and reinforcing
each other, the former was particularly strong during the GATT’s operation,
the latter especially prevalent since the creation of the WTO.
Part II of this Article shifts gears to savor the prescriptive force of the
law-and-politics approach. Let there be no mistake: things are far from perfect in the world of trade. Gone are the days of a cozy GATT-club. Instead,
the threat of a WTO fortress is looming, both for those outside and those
inside the system. Many countries and people, in particular the poor and
vulnerable, feel left behind or locked outside the WTO. For most developing
126
countries, participation in the system remains elusive. Ordinary citizens in
both poor and rich countries perceive the WTO as a fortress hard to penetrate, a system that operates, behind closed doors, in the interest of powerful
producers and exporters, but is oblivious of the rural poor, and the plight of
127
workers or the environment. In this sense, the WTO suffers, first and
foremost, from a lack of popular support, loyalty, or input legitimacy. Yet, at
the same time, unlike the early years of GATT, this lack of input legitimacy
is no longer offset by progress in actual trade liberalization or output legitimacy. The increase in participation or politics that did take place over the
years, in particular the insistence by WTO members on a political veto in
decisionmaking, is currently stifling further welfare-enhancing liberalization
and preventing much-needed reforms to make the system more equitable for
developing countries and more open and supported by civil society. The
deadlock in the political branch, combined with an automatic dispute process, also risks giving too much power to what many see as un-elected,
128
faceless bureaucrats on the judicial branch. As a result, the WTO is perceived as a fortress even by those inside, that is, governments and domestic
polities, tied up in the straightjacket of the WTO single package, with no
126. See, e.g., Oxfam, Rigged Rules and Double Standards: Trade, Globalisation,
and the Fight Against Poverty 5 (2002), at http://www.maketradefair.com/assets/English/
report_english.pdf (“The problem is not that international trade is inherently opposed to the needs
and interests of the poor, but that the rules that govern it are rigged in favour of the rich.”).
127. See Lori’s War, supra note 9; Globalize This! The Battle Against the World
Trade Organization and Corporate Rule (Kevin Danaher & Roger Burbach eds., 2000).
128.

Barfield, supra note 17, at 1.
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way out or forward, either because of economic necessity or because of the
consensus rule and an ever-stricter enforcement mechanism. In sum, the
WTO now lives in what one could call the worst of both worlds: it has a lack
of input legitimacy in that it misses the benefits of popular support or politics and has a lack of output legitimacy because it must do without the
benefits of further trade liberalization and a rule of law perceived as fair and
equitable for everyone.
In Part II of this Article, I first analyze the conventional proposals for
WTO reform and explain why, in isolation, they are counter-productive. As
an alternative to those proposals, focused exclusively on one side of the lawpolitics spectrum, I then suggest a more comprehensive reform package that
takes account of both the law and politics poles. My central claim is that
such a balanced package, although less spectacular than other proposals, is
more likely to make the trading system both more legitimate and more efficient.
A. How Not to Reform the WTO
Knowing that the trade system currently reflects a combination of high
discipline or law and high politics or participation (albeit focused on participation by member states)—if you wish, a combination of a highly efficient
dispute process and a consensus-based rulemaking system—three major
proposals for reform have most commonly been suggested: (1) soften the
WTO’s decisionmaking rules so as to unlock the recurring political stalemates, or in the words of this Article reduce politics or participation by
means of, for example, majority-based decisionmaking; (2) revert to a more
political dispute process with more control by individual members over the
results in specific trade disputes, or, in other words, reduce discipline by, for
example, granting members the right to block the adoption of dispute rulings; and (3) further legalize and/or depoliticize the WTO’s normative
structure to better resist political pressures obstructing trade liberalization
(in other words, further increase discipline through, for example, legal
standing for private parties under the DSU or scrapping the system’s escape
clauses). Each of these proposals is depicted in Chart 2 below. I shall now
address them in turn.
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Chart 2:
Law and Politics of WTO Reform Proposals

1. Facilitate Decisionmaking in the Political Process
A first group of commentators suggests that we leave the WTO enforcement mechanism intact but facilitate its rulemaking process, in
particular, by dropping the consensus requirement. Pascal Lamy, the former
E.C. trade commissioner (and now WTO Director-General), for example,
129
has called the WTO’s decisionmaking process “medieval.” Those commentators would, in other words, maintain the high levels of discipline in
the form of a strong DSU but reduce the strictures of high voice and participation through softer lawmaking procedures such as weighted or majority
voting. This proposal is depicted in Chart 2 above, at Point 1 (“Majority Voting”). Debra Steger, for example, argues that the remedy lies in a smoother
and more efficient rulemaking system. She explains her position thus:
If the system is working very well in one aspect [dispute settlement] and
poorly in another aspect [decisionmaking], should the effective part be
changed to make it less effective, or should the ineffective part be improved to make it stronger and more effective? Simple logic dictates that
Members should fix the part that does not work, and leave the well130
functioning part alone.

Along the same lines, Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, a former Appellate Body
member, argues that the “ideal solution is, of course, to facilitate and thus
129. Charlotte Denny et al., Europe urges shakeup of ‘medieval’ WTO, The Guardian, Sept.
16, 2003, at 15.
130. Debra P. Steger, Book Review, 5 J. Int’l Econ. L. 565, 567 (2002) (reviewing
Barfield, supra note 17).
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131

unblock the political decisionmaking process.” In the same breath, he adds
that he is also “opposed to all suggestions that tend to turn the wheel of history back, in reintroducing elements of the original ‘diplomatic’ model of
132
dispute settlement.” Robert Keohane is of a similar view:
The institutions are a mess: too much judicialization, too little legislation
. . . . If this is the problem, why not strengthen the legislative elements of
the WTO? . . . [T]his change should correct the overweening influence of
the Appellate Body, as Qualified Majority Voting in the E.U. has limited
133
the ability of the European Court of Justice to make new law.

Other authors make more specific suggestions for the facilitation of
WTO decisionmaking. Amrita Narlikar, for example, refers to the establishment of an “executive board” similar to that in the IMF and the World
134
Bank. Thomas Cottier and Satoko Takenoshita have proposed the introduction of a system of weighted voting, based on each WTO member’s
135
trading power. Less drastic, the Sutherland report on the future of the
WTO proposes the creation of a consultative body with membership re136
stricted to a maximum of thirty countries.
This first solution may be called the softer lawmaking or symmetry solution, favored mainly by insider institutionalists, for it would introduce a
degree of symmetry between the powers and efficiency of the judicial and
the political branch of the WTO. Notwithstanding its apparent logic and
symmetrical feel-good factor, considering the law-and-politics curve above,
the symmetry solution is not a solution at all. Indeed, quite the reverse. If, as
I explained earlier, the lourdeur in the political WTO process is a natural
response to higher levels of law and discipline, in particular a stricter dispute process, and this lourdeur is, moreover, a political condition or sine
qua non for WTO members to establish the DSU as well as to digest and
accept the WTO’s increased levels of discipline, taking away the safetyvalve of consensus and veto would undermine the support for a strong WTO
dispute mechanism. It could eventually threaten WTO disciplines more
broadly in that WTO members, faced with weaker outlets for voice and the
prospect of being outvoted, would more frequently seek to exit. This, in
turn, would reestablish the expected equilibrium, but at the bottom of the
131. Ehlermann, supra note 17, at 305; see also Ehlermann & Ehring, supra note 74, at 51
(“Consensus . . . inherently favours the status quo and . . . does not provide for equality. . . . [I]t is
questionable whether it is also more democratic than the majority rule.”).
132.

Ehlermann, supra note 17, at 307.

133. Barfield, supra note 17, at 223 n.52 (quoting email from Robert Keohane to Claude
Barfield (June 11, 2001)).
134. Amrita Narlikar, The Politics of Participation: Decision-Making Processes and Developing Countries in the World Trade Organization, 364 Round Table 171, 178–80 (2002).
135. Cottier & Takenoshita, supra note 21, at 184–86. The authors define trading power in
terms of share of trade, gross domestic product, market openness (defined as proportion of imports
to GDP), and population. Id.; see also Dmitri V. Verenyov, Comment, Vote or Lose: An Analysis of
Decision-Making Alternatives for the World Trade Organization, 51 Buff. L. Rev. 427, 433 (2003).
136.

See Sutherland Report, supra note 18, at 70–71.
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diagonal curve, close to GATT 1947: less politics or participation, brought
about by the “more efficient” rulemaking system, would lead to more pressure on the exit side, such as a weaker DSU and more problems with
noncompliance, or even total exit as in withdrawal from the WTO altogether. In the end, rather than resolving the problem, the symmetry solution
risks undermining the entire WTO regime. Hence the situation of the proposal at Point 1 (“Majority Voting”) in Chart 2 above, which deviates to the
right of the law-and-politics curve with the risk of an “unsupported” regime
or efficiency without loyalty. Consensus decisionmaking is arduous, messy,
and time-consuming. This is the price to pay, however, for a broadly supported and legitimate world trade system. Political deadlocks are
unavoidable, and serious crises and threats of exit from the system part of
137
the game. They should not be overblown since in the past they have
proven to be crucial triggers for further progress.
a. The Lessons from European Integration. The history of European integration offers useful lessons in support of maintaining high levels of voice
or participation for each WTO member, at least in the foreseeable future.
According to Joseph Weiler, the Community’s foundational period from
1958 to the mid-1970s witnessed a dramatic increase in discipline or law in
the form of constitutionalization mainly through the European Court of Justice, coupled with a surge in the need for member state voice or
participation epitomized by a veto for each member state under the Luxem138
bourg Compromise. In some way, this is where the WTO stands today,
toward the end of its foundational period, with an equilibrium between high
discipline in the DSU and high participation through consensus decisionmaking. Determining what happened after this foundational period in
Europe may prove illustrative of what is in store for the WTO. Although
consensus politics, in the shadow of the veto in the Luxembourg Compromise, was needed to establish an equilibrium in the first, foundational period
and to digest the expansion of Community powers in what Weiler discerns
139
as a second crucial period, the costs of such consensus politics became
apparent toward the end of the 1980s:
[T]he Community became increasingly unable to respond to new challenges, that called for real policy choices. Thus, while consensus politics
(the manifestation of enhanced Voice) explains the relative equanimity
with which the jurisdictional limits of the Community broke down in the
1970s, this very consensus model also explains why, within the

137. See, e.g., Sungjoon Cho, A Bridge Too Far: The Fall of the Fifth WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancún and the Future of Trade Constitution, 7 J. Int’l Econ. L. 219 (2004);
Sutherland Report, supra note 18 (exaggerating the prospect of regionalism, a form of exit from
the WTO, as a major threat to multilateralism although it has in the past proven to be a catalyst for
multilateral agreement).
138.

See Weiler, supra note 16, at 36.

139. Weiler discerns a second crucial period, which he calls a period of mutation, during
which Community competences were drastically expanded and became virtually limitless (1973 to
the early 1980s). Id. at 42–43.
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Community’s expanded jurisdiction, it was unable to realize its most traditional and fundamental objectives, such as establishing a single market in
140
the four factors of production.

This political deadlock—not unlike the one we now witness at the
WTO—led to what Weiler distinguishes as the third period in the transformation of Europe: the modern era of 1992, i.e., the enactment of the Single
European Act (“SEA”), and beyond. Key to the SEA’s success was an agreement among E.C. member states to shift to (qualified) majority voting, at
least for those decisions required to complete the single European market.
The exit-voice, law-politics equilibrium, however, was thereby out of balance: majority voting meant reduced voice. So what was required in
response? Indeed, a counterbalancing decrease in discipline or law, in other
words, a number of cracks appeared in the constitutional structure of the
141
Community: among other things, a national safeguard mechanism and the
142
official acknowledgement of a multiple-speed Europe. At the same time,
Weiler argues that further challenges to the Community’s legal-normative
foundation may have been prevented by the member states’ sense of loyalty
toward the European project:
[A]cceptance of Community discipline may have become the constitutional reflex of the Member States and their organs. A Loyalty to the
institution may have developed that breaks out of the need for constant
equilibrium. The two decades of enhanced Voice thus constitute a learning
and adaptation process resulting in socialization; at the end of this period
decisional changes affecting Voice will not cause a corresponding adjust143
ment to Exit.

Yet, loyalty in the Community sphere, Weiler explains, “is precarious
because there is a legitimacy dissonance between the constitutional claims
144
of the polity and its social reality.” Challenges of democracy and legiti-

140.

Id. at 66.

141. See Treaty Establishing the European Community, Nov. 10, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 3,
art. 95(4) [hereinafter E.C. Treaty] (permitting member states, subsequent to a harmonization measure at the Community level, to enact national measures as long as they are proven to be necessary,
taken on legitimate grounds, and non-discriminatory); Weiler, supra note 16, at 69.
142. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, Nov. 10, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C
340) 2, arts. 11(2), 40, 43(g) (enabling closer or enhanced cooperation between a limited number of
member states with the option for other member states to stay out); Weiler, supra note 16, at 73,
99–101. Along the same lines, note that the new European Constitution, for the very first time, explicitly includes a provision permitting members to leave the E.U. altogether. Treaty Establishing
the Constitution for Europe, Dec. 16, 2004, 2004 O.J. (C 310) 1, art. I-60 [hereinafter European
Constitution]. This explicit option for total exit can be seen as another response to lower levels of
voice. Although it may never be resorted to, the possibility provides an important, symbolical safety
valve.
143.

Weiler, supra note 16, at 77.

144.

Id. at 99.
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macy, especially social legitimacy, that is, “societal acceptance of the sys145
tem,” remain:
People accept the majoritarian principle of democracy within a polity to
which they see themselves as belonging.
....
. . . The current shift to majority voting might therefore exacerbate legitimacy problems. Even an enhanced European Parliament, which would
operate on a co-decision principle, will not necessarily solve the legitimacy
problem. The legitimacy crisis does not derive principally from the accountability issue at the European level, but from the very redefinition of
146
the European polity.

In other words, for Weiler, at the European level, as at any other level of
governance, there can be no democracy without demos.
What lesson can the world trade system learn from this European story?
In my view, it is this: if even at the more integrated European level the need
for voice or participation of individual member states was so strongly felt in
response to increases in law or discipline, and an equally strong pressure to
reduce law or discipline emerged when faced, for example, with majority
voting, then a fortiori these interacting needs for participation and discipline, voice and exit, must play a role at the more loosely integrated and
wildly more diverse WTO. At the WTO level, individual members insist all
the more on their sovereignty and the member-driven nature of the organiza147
tion. As a result, executive or majority-based voting at that level is likely
to put even more pressure on the exit side. In addition, in Europe, decades of
strong voice, participation, and vetoes gradually nurtured a sense of loyalty
toward the European project, through “decades of enhanced Voice [and] . . .
148
a learning and adaptation process resulting in socialization.” At the WTO,
in contrast, the process of socialization has hardly begun. On the contrary, to
the extent WTO legalization is equated with depoliticization, or keeping the
trade game removed as far as possible from domestic politics, nontrade concerns, and social contestation, the raison d’être of the WTO is to skirt
engagement with the broader society. Indeed, it would not be unfair to say
that at this moment most layers of society have serious doubts as to the
WTO project, be it because they feel left behind, as developing countries
feel, or because they perceive the WTO as a front for big business and dehumanizing capitalist values. As a result, not enough loyalty exists in the
WTO today either to replace voice or to keep exit at bay. In this context,
without drastically reducing current levels of discipline or law and thereby
weakening the system’s normative structure and effectiveness, it is hard to

145.

Id. at 80.

146.

Id. at 83–85 (citation omitted).

147.

Sutherland Report, supra note 18, at 69; Jackson, supra note 17, at 72.

148.

Weiler, supra note 16, at 77.
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imagine that any WTO member could accept being outvoted based on some
149
majority-voting rule, be it a majority of WTO members (which would give
disproportionate power to countries like Luxembourg and Trinidad and Tobago) or, even less so, a majority of the people living in WTO members
(which, of course, would hugely favor countries like China and India). If the
emergence of a European demos is questionable, the feasibility of a worldwide, WTO demos is even more elusive. Whatever other forms may exist to
150
legitimize international governance, in the WTO none are currently strong
enough to support the revolutionary shift from consensus to majority-based
decisionmaking without seriously undermining the trade system’s effectiveness, including its strong dispute process. The European story—and its ongoing quest for legitimacy notwithstanding the existence of a European Parliament (witness the 2005 referenda rejecting a proposed Constitution for
Europe)—ought to warn the world trade community to be patient and to
build on incremental changes and improvements.
b. The Lessons from the Failed New International Economic Order
(“NIEO”). The difficulty of setting up an effective and legitimate system
based on majority voting at the world level is further illustrated by the failure of the NIEO. Strengthened by growing numbers and their power in the
world economy, in particular because of the oil crises, in the 1960s and
1970s developing countries became increasingly frustrated with the strictures of the GATT system and the need for consensus to change it. As a
result, they turned their attention to the U.N. and, through the much softer
lawmaking process prevalent there, requiring only simple and two-thirds
151
majorities, created “their own” United Nations Conference on Trade and
152
Development (UNCTAD). Through a series of hotly contested U.N. General Assembly Resolutions, all adopted without the support of the developed
153
world, they unilaterally declared the existence of a New International
Economic Order, excusing themselves from any meaningful reforms and
trade liberalization efforts, which should, after all, be beneficial to develop149. Crudely put, the big WTO players, such as the United States and the E.C., zealously
defend the consensus rule so as not to be constantly outvoted by the large majority of WTO members, three-fourths of which are developing nations. Equally, developing countries strongly defend
the consensus rule because it protects them against the whim of the most powerful and gives them
the security (or at least the illusion) of a veto for all WTO decisions. Recall in this respect that developing nations do not always form a homogeneous group and often have contradictory interests.
Hence, for them as well there is a risk inherent in majority voting even in an organization that consists of three-fourths developing countries.
150. See Daniel Bodansky, The Legitimacy of International Governance, 93 Am. J. Int’l L.
596 (1999); Ruth W. Grant & Robert O. Keohane, Accountability and Abuses of Power in World
Politics, 99 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 29 (2005) (calling on commentators to think outside the democratic
box and laying out a series of accountability models based on participation and delegation);
Keohane & Nye, supra note 119.
151.

See U.N. Charter, art. 18, ¶¶ 2, 3.

152.
1964).

G.A. Res. 1995, U.N. GAOR, 19th Sess., Supp. No. 15, U.N. Doc. 1/5815 (Dec. 30,

153.
(1990).

See F.V. Garcia-Amador, The Emerging International Law of Development 171
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ing countries themselves, whilst imposing strict obligations on the developed world and its economic operators active in developing countries.
Hence, instead of working out a consensus at GATT, developing countries
created the NIEO through the U.N. without the support of the developed
world. Without any voice or support from those who, in economic and political terms, mattered most, they created a new regime hoping it would
change the landscape of world trade.
Viewed through the lens of the law-and-politics paradigm, the effort was
doomed to fail: low or no voice at all cannot possibly keep exit at bay. As a
result, the NIEO never had any real impact, especially not on developed
154
countries, and ultimately ended in utter failure. With the benefit of hindsight, the consensus requirement in GATT that blocked the most extreme
developing country demands may, therefore, have been the GATT’s savior
as well as the secret of its further success when compared to the stagnation,
ineffectiveness, and political infighting often seen in those days at, for example, the U.N. General Assembly or, in the 1960s, UNCTAD. The harder
lawmaking entailed by the consensus requirement was, indeed, a necessary
feeding ground for the corresponding hardening of the GATT normative
regime and the reduction in trade barriers and increase in welfare that came
with it. In contrast, had developing countries been able to push ahead their
NIEO demands within the GATT, without the support or voice of the major
trading nations, the GATT would most likely have met the same fate as the
NIEO: commercial irrelevance.
c. Hidden Benefits of the WTO Consensus Rule. Let it be clear, finally,
155
what the WTO consensus rule stands for. Consensus does not require the
positive vote of each and every WTO member. In this sense, it differs from
unanimity. A consensus decision implies a proposal that was not explicitly
156
objected to by any WTO member present at the particular meeting. It is
much easier to reach than unanimity, if only because there is no need to get
the explicit vote of all 150 members. Countries not affected by, or not interested in, the issue at hand can remain silent. Given the shadow of the future,
members have an incentive to use their veto sparingly, that is, only for decisions vital to them. This makes consensus decisionmaking not completely

154. See Thomas Franck, Lessons of the Failure of NIEO, in Canadian Council on International Law, International Law and Development: Proceedings of the Fifteenth
Annual Conference 82 (Brian Etherington et al. eds., 1986); Stephen Zamora, Voting in International Economic Organizations, 74 Am. J. Int’l L. 566, 608 (1980) (“An international economic
organization that does not reflect actual economic forces, in its operations as well as in its decisionmaking processes . . . has little promise as an active, effective agency.”). The NIEO was a failure not
the least because it meant that for decades many developing countries missed the opportunity to
reform their political and economic systems, thereby depriving themselves of participation in the
world economy.
155. See Mary E. Footer, The Role of Consensus in GATT/WTO Decision-Making, 17 Nw J.
Int’l L. & Bus. 653 (1996); Richard H. Steinberg, In the Shadow of Law or Power: ConsensusBased Bargaining and Outcomes in the GATT/WTO, 56 Int’l Org. 339 (2002).
156.

See Howse, supra note 96.
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unlike decisionmaking by an executive committee. Crucially, the consensus rule also resembles weighted voting in that it gives more weight to
158
politically and economically powerful players. A consensus rule does not
159
mean that every player has equal power. It thereby has the positive attribute of weighted voting in that it reflects power realities and does not give
160
disproportionate weight to small or non-affected countries. This should go
a long way in countering the criticism that consensus decisionmaking at the
WTO gives too much power to developing nations who represent a small
share in world trade but a three-fourths majority of the WTO membership.
The criticism remains that under the consensus rule the big players have too
much power. This risk is real but can be mitigated by repeat play and the
shadow of the future. Evidence shows, for example, that recent developingcountry participation in WTO General Council meetings has increased dra161
matically as compared to the early years of the WTO. Moreover, when it
comes to actual decisionmaking, even a coalition of the most powerful WTO
players can eventually be blocked by the veto of a single developing country. Although small countries will not be able to use their veto often, for
those questions that are crucial to them the veto remains a viable option.
Finally, it must be recalled that the WTO treaty maintained a relic of decisionmaking from GATT 1947, namely the rule that if no consensus can be
reached on an issue, the fallback is, unless otherwise provided, majority voting. Although this option has not been exercised in the first ten years of the
WTO’s existence, it may still play a role in the future. It would be sufficient
for the threat of majority voting to become real. If so, consensus decisionmaking would operate in the shadow of a vote. This would facilitate
consensus building and may strengthen the voice of weaker countries. It
may be appropriate, in this respect, to distinguish between different types of
157. It avoids, however, the politically sensitive decision as to which countries sit on the
committee, and has the benefit of having the flexibility of different “committees” depending on the
issue.
158. See Hirschman, supra note 15, at 40 (“[V]oice is . . . conditioned on the influence and
bargaining power customers and members can bring to bear [on] . . . the organizations to which they
belong.”); Jackson, supra note 33, at 128.
159. See Steinberg, supra note 155, at 365 (“The GATT/WTO decision-making rules have
allowed adherence to both the instrumental reality of asymmetrical power and the logic of appropriateness of sovereign equality.”).
160. See Zamora, supra note 154. At the same time, the consensus rule avoids some of the
major drawbacks of weighted voting: there is no need to agree ex ante on a list of votes by country,
nor on the criteria that will be used to divide the votes. Within the informal structure of consensus
decisionmaking, the major stakeholders, as well as their weight, can differ depending on the question and interests at hand.
161. To give an indication, when comparing country participation during the first nine General Council meetings (Jan. 1995–Dec. 1995) to that during nine more recent General Council
meetings (Dec. 2002–Feb. 2004), both in terms of intervention frequency and number of words,
developing-country participation has boomed. During the former period (1995), the first developing
country in terms of intervention frequency was only ranked sixth (Argentina, 3.6%, compared to the
E.C., ranked first, with 10.8%). During the latter period (2002–2004), interventions were spread far
more equally, with the U.S. ranked first at 5.4%, E.C. and India second with 3.6% each, and Kenya
sixth with 2.8%. (Data and statistics are on file with the author.)
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WTO decisions. So-called housekeeping or internal WTO decisions—such
162
as the appointment of a new WTO Director-General —could at times be
taken by majority voting or at least in the shadow of majority voting. The
same could be done for decisions that do not alter WTO rights and obligations, in particular authoritative interpretations which, on paper, need only a
three-fourths majority. Such authoritative interpretations, even if taken only
in the shadow of a vote, could facilitate legislative correction of unpalatable
dispute rulings, i.e., offer an insurance policy for voice in the event dispute
settlement goes wrong. This, in turn, could rectify one of the most important
drawbacks of the current balance between high law or discipline and its efficient dispute process and high politics or participation with its requirement
163
for consensus in the political process.
2. Revert to a GATT-like, Diplomatic Dispute Settlement Process
Instead of strengthening the political branch, for example through majority voting, a logical alternative to cure the current asymmetry between the
WTO judicial and political branches is to weaken the judicial arm; in particular, to lower discipline or law under the DSU. The most vocal proponent
of this solution is Claude Barfield of the American Enterprise Institute, a
conservative think tank. When it comes to the asymmetry problem,
Barfield’s focus is not so much on the inefficient rulemaking process, but
rather on the new, judicialized WTO dispute system. He sees the DSU as
“politically unsustainable . . . because the imbalance between ineffective
rule-making procedures and highly efficient judicial mechanisms will increasingly pressure the panels and the [Appellate Board] to ‘create’ law,
164
raising intractable questions of democratic legitimacy.” To correct the
asymmetry, which Barfield considers to be both an imbalance and a “constitutional flaw” (although earlier, I explained why it is rather a logical—
although not necessarily optimal—equilibrium), he recommends alternatives
that would reintroduce some of the former elements of “diplomatic” flexibility that characterized the earlier GATT regime. In Barfield’s view,
conciliation, mediation, and voluntary arbitration need to be added as real
alternatives; in addition, if a substantial minority of WTO members clearly
opposes a decision, a blocking mechanism should be used to set aside that
decision until further negotiations produce a consensus.
By reintroducing the possibility for defendants, assisted by a minority of
WTO members, to block the adoption of panel and Appellate Body reports,
162. See General Council, Procedures for the Appointment of Directors-General ¶ 20, U.N.
Doc. WT/L/509 (Dec. 10, 2000) (stating that in the event no consensus can be reached by the deadline, “[m]embers should consider the possibility of recourse to a vote as a last resort by a procedure
to be determined at that time”).
163. See Ehlermann & Ehring, supra note 74, at 13. See generally, Eric J. Pan, Authoritative
Interpretations of Agreements: Developing More Responsive International Administrative Regimes,
38 Harv. Int’l L. J. 503 (1997).
164.

Barfield, supra note 17, at 7.
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Barfield would obviously increase the options for WTO members to exit
from their WTO obligations. Hence the situation of his proposal at Point 2
in Chart 2 above (“Veto in Dispute Process”). Moreover, through the lens of
the law-and-politics curve, less law or discipline (reintroduction of vetoes in
the dispute process) would, indeed, reduce the need for politics and voice
and ought to lead to a more efficient rulemaking process; once WTO Members experience that the law they create is softer, they are more likely to
agree to the creation of new law. Hence, the political process of rulemaking
is likely to become more efficient: softer law leads to softer law-making;
less discipline requires less participation.
Granted, therefore, that less discipline or law may lead to a smoother
decisionmaking process and facilitate legislative correction of the Appellate
Body—Barfield’s main objective—the reform has one major flaw: it
overlooks almost 100 years of trade history. This history, as recounted in
Part I, tells us that through a process of trial and error, it was discovered that
for the world trade system to be effective, in particular once it started
addressing more elusive nontariff barriers, it had to be coupled with an
independent and automatic enforcement mechanism. Softer forms of
mediation or consultations alone would not do. In other words, for the
political consensus to stick and, in particular, for trade liberalization to
materialize in the face of domestic pressures for protectionism, the rules of
the game had to be backed up by a strong legal-normative system. Similar to
proposals for a wholesale reintroduction of representative politics in the
165
world trade system (depicted at Point 3 in Chart 2 above, “Representative
Politics”), reintroducing vetoes in the dispute process overlooks the need for
precommitment and discipline to tame the protectionist excesses of
166
representative politics. Without such hand-tying, the WTO would soon be
ineffective and fail to fulfill its crucially important mandate of welfare167
enhancing trade liberalization. Hence the situation, in Chart 2 above, of
both the proposal for a veto in the dispute process (Point 2) and a wholesale
reintroduction of representative politics (Point 3) to the left of the law-andpolitics curve with the risk of an “ineffective” regime or loyalty without
efficiency. Over time, both Points 2 and 3 would be drawn back to the
equilibrium of the diagonal curve, yet, at the bottom of that curve, slightly
above GATT 47, as a political veto in the dispute process would inevitably
lead to lower levels of actual integration.
The experience of the Great Depression and World War II prompted
GATT negotiators to go beyond the lofty rhetoric of political declarations
and to agree to more specific, legally binding commitments in 1947. The

165.

See sources cited supra note 127 and, to a lesser degree, Howse, supra note 26.

166.

See supra note 11.

167. See George W. Downs et al., Is the Good News about Compliance Good News About
Cooperation?, 50 Int’l Org. 379, 395–97 (noting that “deeper” international cooperation that
requires more extensive changes to domestic laws and practices requires a strong monitoring and
enforcement mechanism).
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forty-seven years of operation of GATT have one recurring theme: the gradual independence of the dispute resolution mechanism spurred by the
realization that without strong normative pull trade liberalization will not
materialize. This was painfully experienced, in particular, in the 1960s and
1970s, when many GATT rules were simply put aside and the entire trade
system almost collapsed. The need for a strong enforcement mechanism was
again felt in the years leading to the Uruguay Round, when a combination of
exit pressures—ranging from the blocking of panel reports to the conclusion
of regional trade deals and U.S. unilateralism—seriously undermined the
168
world trade system. Indeed, it was exactly the type of mechanism that
Barfield now proposes—the possibility for countries to block dispute settlement—that triggered U.S. unilateralism and necessitated the DSU
reforms, including the setting aside of vetoes. Without those DSU reforms,
the United States, in particular, would not have signed off on the WTO
169
treaty.
Whilst reintroducing political vetoes in the dispute process would, therefore, be “a regression towards some of the very important problems in the
170
GATT era” and risk an ineffective world trade regime, a better solution to
alleviate Barfield-type fears—fears that the WTO judiciary acts ultra vires—
consists of two steps. First, we must value the need for, and legitimizing
168. Although the GATT dispute process with vetoes worked reasonably well (according to
Robert Hudec, for example, eighty percent of all GATT cases were resolved in a satisfactory manner, see Hudec, Evolution, supra note 64; Robert Hudec et al., A Statistical Profile of GATT
Dispute Settlement Cases: 1948–1989, 2 Minn. J. Global Trade 1, 32–34 (1993)), this success is
relative and not guaranteed in the context of the WTO. First, it is relative because the GATT figures
do not include those disputes that members never bothered to raise formally because they knew that
the process would be blocked. Second, and more importantly, the relative success of the GATT
system with vetoes is unlikely to transpose to the much broader and deeper commitments made in
the new WTO treaty. WTO commitments go well beyond tariff questions and impose disciplines in
far more sensitive areas (such as health, safety, services trade, and intellectual property protection).
When faced with complaints in those fields, WTO members would be much more inclined to use
their vetoes, thereby risking the paralysis of the entire process. This was apparent already in the late
1980s and early 1990s when, according to Hudec’s own statistics, forty percent of disputes were
blocked, especially those involving nontariff barriers (such as the Report of the Appellate Body, EC
Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), U.N. Doc. WT/DS26/AB/R (Jan. 16,
1998)), reaching the point of undermining the entire dispute process. Hence, in the context of the
WTO, a system with vetoes is most likely to be far less successful than it has been under GATT. In
2002, Hudec himself rejected Barfield’s proposal to allow a substantial minority to block any legal
ruling: “I feel certain that governments would never be able to employ such a blocking power objectively. It would become a political filter for all legal rulings, pure and simple. . . . [I]t would
probably leave the WTO legal system in the unflattering position of the spider’s web that catches
only middle-sized flies.” Hudec, supra note 1, at 222.
169. It is, therefore, no small irony that it is exactly the United States that recently espoused
Barfield-type reforms. Faced with a number of losses in WTO dispute settlement, the United States
proposed to permit the partial adoption of dispute rulings by the DSB, in case the parties disagree
with a particular finding. See Negotiations on Improvements and Clarifications of the DSU on Improving Flexibility and Member Control in WTO Dispute Settlement, Contribution by Chile and the
United States, U.N. Doc. TN/DSW/28 (Dec. 23 2002). In the process, much like Barfield himself,
the United States seems to have forgotten about the original reasons why it pushed so hard for DSU
automaticity in the first place: foot-dragging and blocking by the E.C. and other GATT parties,
threatening support for trade liberalization at home.
170.

Sutherland Report, supra note 18, at 56.
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factor of, a rigorous, rules-based judiciary at the international level as much
as we do domestically, and forget the illusion that decisionmaking by repre171
sentative democracy is inherently and always better than by judiciary. That
is what separation of powers or checks and balances is all about. The judiciary needs political control as much as politics needs judicial implementation
and oversight. Or do we want, or even trust, for example, the U.S Congress
172
to decide each and every civil dispute or murder trial?
Second, we need to think creatively about legislative checks and balances on the WTO judiciary other than the nuclear option of vetoes in the
173
dispute process. The DSU itself includes a powerful warning against judicial activism: It explicitly prohibits panels and the Appellate Body to “add
174
to or diminish the rights and obligations” of WTO members. Another
form of political checks and balances is the control, or at least the sense of
control, given to disputing parties over who will serve on a panel and the
175
Appellate Body. In most cases, panel members are appointed with the
176
agreement of both parties. Appellate Body members, in turn, can only be
appointed, and after four years need to be reappointed, by consensus of all
177
178
This control must be maintained.
Also during
WTO Members.
171. See supra note 11 (discussing the need to restrict discretionary powers of governments
because of the so-called time consistency problem).
172. Equally, the possibility of (a minority of) individual WTO members blocking the dispute
process would seriously taint the objectivity and legal quality of dispute rulings. As happened in the
GATT days, when panels operated in the shadow of a veto, WTO panels would again have to take
up a political role and craft their decisions in such a way that they would pass muster with the required majority of WTO members. The adoption process, as well, would inevitably lead to power
games and nasty political infighting, bargaining, and trade-offs (of the sort, “I support blocking your
ruling if you support blocking mine”). This combination of factors would bring into question the
foundations of the WTO normative structure (“why should I comply with a ruling if you refuse to do
so?”) and with it the effectiveness and legitimacy of the world trade regime itself.
173. See Tom Ginsburg, Abstract, International Judicial Lawmaking, (Illinois Law and
Economics, Working Paper No. LE05-006, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=693861
(“While formal mechanisms to over-rule international judges are relatively difficult to exercise,
states have at their disposal various informal mechanisms to communicate their views to judges.”).
174.

DSU, supra note 4, art. 3.2, 19.2.

175. The importance of this control is confirmed, for example, in Andy Stoler, The WTO
Dispute Settlement Process: Did We Get What Negotiators Wanted? (May 2003) (unpublished
manuscript, presented at the Dartmouth-Tuck Forum on International Trade and Business, Managing
Global Trade: The WTO—Trade Remedies and Dispute Settlement), available at http://
mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/cib/news/dtf_2003_pdf/Stoler.pdf (last visited Aug. 2, 2005).
176. DSU, supra note 4, art. 8.9 provides, however, that in the absence of agreement between
the parties who will serve on a panel, either party can request the WTO Director-General to appoint
the panelists.
177.

See id. arts. 2.4, 17.2.

178. Equally important as a political check are the de facto reservation of U.S., E.C., and
Japanese seats on the Appellate Body with the other four seats rotating on a geographical basis and
the practice that even nationals of a disputing party can sit on an Appellate Body division. For a
controversial defense of what is somewhat misleadingly referred to as “dependent” judiciaries over
“independent” ones (dependency being defined “in the sense that the judges are appointed by the
state parties for the purpose of resolving a particular dispute”), see Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, A
Theory of International Adjudication, 93 Cal. L. Rev. 1, 3 (2005).
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dispute proceedings, common judicial techniques can accommodate and
respond to political sensitivities such as open hearings and increased transparency, deference, judicial minimalism, putting the burden of proving an
179
obligation on the complainant, and even declaring a non liquet. In addition, the political control that the DSB currently exercises over dispute
settlement ought not be underestimated. As the umbilical cord between the
political and judicial branch, it is a crucial interface and forum of contestation or voice to which both panels and the Appellate Body are most
receptive. The outcry in the DSB against the Appellate Body’s acceptance of
180
amicus curiae briefs in the E.C.—Asbestos dispute offers a good example.
Ever since, the Appellate Body has not drawn information from such briefs
even if they were formally accepted, and a number of panels even refused
181
outright to accept amicus briefs. This confirms a broader avenue for
political control, or at least political responsiveness, in that courts, including
in particular the WTO Appellate Body, have clear incentives to act with restraint, cognizant of their political context and perceived legitimacy. To
garnish legitimacy and ensure implementation of their rulings—after all, the
ultimate test of their power—Appellate Body members are “eager to avoid
182
adverse political responses by WTO member states.” More than formal
controls, it is those considerations of legitimacy and effectiveness that over
time will keep the WTO judiciary in check with the WTO political branch.
Finally, as pointed out earlier, authoritative interpretations correcting
dispute rulings remain a possibility for formal legislative correction and, at
least on the books, require a mere three-fourths majority. As elaborated below, resisting the temptation of ever more legalization, including the
temptation of judicial activism and a strict rule of precedent, and maintaining crucial exit options such as meaningful escape clauses and relatively
weak remedies would take some steam off the judicial branch. This, in turn,
should facilitate political consensus building and legislative correction, and
could even make three-fourths majority interpretations digestible. Equally,
more participation and contestation in WTO affairs as suggested below, that

179. See Bartels, supra note 113; William J. Davey, Has the WTO Dispute Settlement System
Exceeded Its Authority?, 4 J. Int’l Econ. L. 79 (2001); Jeffrey Dunoff, The Death of the Trade
Regime, 10 Eur. J. Int’l L. 756 (1999); J. Patrick Kelly, Judicial Activism at the WTO: Developing
Principles of Self-Restraint, 22 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 353 (2002); see also Hudec, supra note 1, at
215, 219 (“Courts do have legal tools that permit them to deflect pressures to legislate . . . . [T]he
best option at the present time would be to continue dealing with the problem cases as they come,
under the present DSU rules, subject to whatever technical improvements governments may agree
to.”). See generally Cass R. Sunstein, One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism on the Supreme Court (1999).
180.

General Council, Minutes of Meeting, U.N. Doc. WT/GC/60 (Nov. 22, 2000).

181. See, e.g., Panel Report, United States—Final Countervailing Duty Determination with
Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada, at 71 n.75, U.N. Doc. WT/DS257/R (Feb. 17,
2004); Panel Report, United States—Investigation of the International Trade Commission in Softwood Lumber from Canada, at 88 n.75, U.N. Doc. WT/DS277/R (Apr. 26 2005).
182. James McCall Smith, WTO Dispute Settlement: The Politics of Procedure in Appellate Body
Rulings, 2 World Trade Rev. 64, 75 (2003); see also Steinberg, supra note 19.
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is more politics, should help avoid overreaching by the Appellate Body and
lay a broader basis of support for its rulings.
3. Further Legalize/Depoliticize the WTO
A third group of commentators focuses its attention on further
improving the legal-normative branch of the WTO (see Chart 2 above,
Point 4: “More Legalization/Depoliticization”). Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann,
for example, is a strong advocate of further constitutionalization of the
WTO. He construes WTO rights and obligations as individual human
rights and at the domestic level would give direct effect to those rights
183
before domestic courts. In various ways and degrees, Cottier (direct
184
effect of WTO rules before domestic courts), Weiler (ending the
diplomatic remnants of dispute settlement in favor of a more openly
185
legalized approach), Ragosta (standing for private parties under the
186
187
DSU), Bhala (calling for a de jure rule of precedent), and Horlick and
188
Mavroidis (tougher remedies) have also advocated a further thickening of
the WTO legal system. Authors expressing support for judicial activism or
constitutionalization through Appellate Body rulings fall under the same
189
category. In a more sweeping theory, McGinnis and Movsesian endorse
WTO adjudicative power but warn against any attempt to draw the WTO
190
into the politics of nontrade concerns. In their view, depoliticization or
separation of trade law from domestic and international politics is not so
much a problem. Rather it is the very purpose of the WTO and a
prerequisite to economic liberalization.
a. The Risks and Illusions of Further Legalization. How would this
harder law approach—if implemented in isolation—play out under the law183. See, e.g., Petersmann, supra note 14; Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Time for a United Nations
‘Global Compact’ for Integrating Human Rights into the Law of Worldwide Organizations: Lessons
from European Integration, 13 Eur. J. Int’l L. 621 (2002).
184. Thomas Cottier & Krista Nadakavukaren Schefer, The Relationship between World Trade
Organization Law, National and Regional Law, 1 J. Int’l Econ. L. 83 (1998).
185. J.H.H. Weiler, The Rule of Lawyers and the Ethos of Diplomats: Reflections on the Internal
and External Legitimacy of WTO Dispute Settlement, 35 J. World Trade 191 (2001).
186.

Ragosta, supra note 20.

187. Raj Bhala, The Power of the Past: Towards De Jure Stare Decisis in WTO Adjudication
(Part Three of a Trilogy), 33 Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. 873 (2001).
188. Gary N. Horlick, Problems With the Compliance Structure of the WTO Dispute Resolution Process, in The Political Economy of International Trade Law 636 (Daniel Kennedy &
James Southwick eds., 2002); Petros C. Mavroidis, Remedies in the WTO Legal System: Between a
Rock and a Hard Place, 11 Eur. J. Int’l L. 763 (2000).
189. See Deborah Z. Cass, The ‘Constitutionalization’ of International Trade Law: Judicial
Norm-Generation as the Engine of Constitutional Development in International Trade, 12 Eur. J.
Int’l L. 39 (2001); Joanne Scott, International Trade and Environmental Governance: Relating
Rules (and Standards) in the EU and the WTO, 15 Eur. J. Int’l L. 307 (2004) (calling for the Appellate Body to review the validity of international standards enacted by other organizations to
stimulate much-needed reform in those organizations).
190.

McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 10.
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and-politics curve? To begin with, further legalization would only worsen
the current asymmetry between the judicial and the political branch. Judicial
activism by the Appellate Body, in particular, risks lawmaking with almost
no voice, participation, or guidance from WTO members. Under the lawand-politics curve, in a politically sensitive organization like the WTO, such
activism, although it may trigger short-term liberalization and predictability
gains, would not be sustainable: more discipline or law requires more, not
191
less, participation and politics. Indeed, if a choice had to be made between
judicial lawmaking and voting by qualified majority—the softer lawmaking
proposal discussed earlier—the latter may well be the least of two evils.
This was exactly one of the reasons used to sell majority voting in the E.C.,
192
in the wake of judicial activism by the ECJ. Conversely, knowing that legalization or increased discipline unequivocally calls for more politics and
expression of voice or participation, the harder law solution would only
worsen, not resolve, the current deadlock in the political, rulemaking process: countries would insist even more on their veto rights. Moreover, since
harder law or more discipline cannot be sustained without more political
support or more politics, it is highly questionable, as things stand today, that
sufficient political support—be it at the state or broader societal level—is
193
available to make such further legalization digestible. In this context, further legalizing the WTO is, in the medium to long term, unlikely to offer
194
tangible gains in trade liberalization. It risks rather serious pressure on the
exit side: even under increased legalization, WTO members, especially the
most powerful ones, could walk away from their obligations. This, in turn,
may undermine, rather than strengthen, the legitimacy and effectiveness of
the trade regime. Hence the situation of this proposal in Chart 2 above at
Point 4 (“More Legalization/Depoliticization”), deviating to the right of the
law-and-politics curve with the risk of an “unsupported” regime or efficiency without loyalty. As with the other reform proposals, the expected
191. Given the consensus rule, and the need to keep it for the time being, the WTO judiciary
cannot afford to be as activist as, for example, the ECJ. The ECJ could, for instance, extend the list
of Article 30 E.C. Treaty exceptions (similar to GATT Article XX) as well as more easily strike
down member state measures since it knew that E.C. member states acting jointly could respond and
enact secondary legislation such as an E.C.-wide environmental regulation that no longer restricts
intra-Community trade but takes account of the concern originally expressed in the condemned
member state measure. The WTO does not have similar legislative powers.
192. See Koen Lenaerts, Some Thoughts about the Interaction Between Judges and Politicians, 1992 U. Chi. Legal F. 93, 111 (1992); Peter L. Lindseth, Democratic Legitimacy and the
Administrative Character of Supranationalism: The Example of the European Community, 99
Colum. L. Rev. 628, 633 (1999).
193. See Goldstein et al., supra note 2, at 391 (referring to “misguided attempts to construct a
stable order on the basis of fragile norms rather than realities of power politics”); see also Laurence
Helfer, Overlegalizing Human Rights: International Relations Theory and the Commonwealth Caribbean Backlash against Human Rights Regimes, 102 Colum. L. Rev. 1832 (2002).
194. See Judith Goldstein & Lisa L. Martin, Legalization, Trade Liberalization, and Domestic
Politics: A Cautionary Note, 54 Int’l Org. 603 (2000); Joost Pauwelyn, The Limits of Litigation:
Americanization and Negotiation in the Settlement of WTO Disputes, 19 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 121 (2003); Amelia Porges, Settling WTO Disputes: What Do Litigation Models Tell Us? 19
Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 141 (2003).
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equilibrium would soon be reestablished, yet, at a much lower level of integration along the diagonal curve, somewhere between GATT 47 and WTO
94.
In each stage of the transformation of the world trade system, the maintenance of, or even selective increase in, exit options was an absolute
precondition for reaching consensus and concluding new agreements. As
pointed out, without broad exceptions and multiple escape clauses such as
safeguards, tariff renegotiations, waivers, and weak remedies, the original
GATT could not have been concluded. Equally, the Tokyo Round agreements would not have been finalized but for certain exit options; in
particular, the à la carte nature of the Tokyo Round Codes on nontariff barriers and the exclusion of GATT developing countries from both new and
195
existing GATT disciplines through, for example, the Enabling Clause. The
successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round, as well, required the confirmation of certain exit options. Notwithstanding the general thickening of the
WTO legal structure, GATT’s original safety valves were maintained, some
196
were even expanded, and most of them were also transposed to new WTO
197
agreements on trade in goods, GATS, and TRIPS. Moreover, the remedies
to counter violations under the streamlined DSU remained as weak as those
in GATT Article XXIII: no reparation for past damage is awarded, compensation for ongoing harm is still subject to agreement between the parties,
and a reciprocal suspension of concessions—which, after all, is just another
form of exit—remains the measure of last resort. On the contrary, in at least
one respect, WTO remedies were actually weakened: the DSU reduced the
scope for retaliation from suspension as determined “to be appropriate in the
198
circumstances” to suspension “equivalent to the level of the nullification
199
or impairment” caused by the original violation.

195.

See supra note 73.

196. Reservations to renegotiate tariff concessions pursuant to GATT Article XXVIII:5 (i.e.,
outside the three year interval and without authorization) increased as GATT evolved into the WTO.
For the period between 1994 and 1996, more such reservations (thirty-seven in total) were made
than in any other period (compare to four in the period 1958–1960). See Anwarul Hoda, Tariff
Negotiations and Renegotiations under the GATT and the WTO: Procedures and Practices 89 (2001).
197. See the broad substantive exceptions in, for example, GATS, supra note 7, art. XIV,
TRIPS, supra note 7, art. 13, and TBT, supra note 7, art. 2.2. Based on GATT art. XXVIII (tariff
renegotiations), GATS permits members to renegotiate GATS specific commitments. GATS, supra
note 7, art. XXI. GATS also calls for the consideration of a safeguards mechanism for trade in services, GATS, supra note 7, art. X, but none has been introduced yet. As it stands, however, GATS
already includes a series of built-in safeguards (e.g. unlike GATT art. III, there is no general obligation under GATS to provide national treatment; according to GATS art. XVII, this obligation is only
triggered to the extent a member has made a specific commitment). Finally, waivers under art. IX of
the WTO Charter apply across all WTO agreements including GATS and TRIPS.
198.

GATT, supra note 5, art. XXIII:2.

199. DSU, supra note 4, art. 22.4. While the old GATT rule left open, at least in theory, the
possibility for punitive sanctions, the new DSU provision limits suspension to equivalence to the
harm caused. See also WTO Agreement, supra note 3, Prohibited Subsidies, art. 4.10 n.9, 1869
U.N.T.S. 17 (permitting “appropriate countermeasures” but clarifying that “[t]his expression is not
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Given the uncertainties of the future, both political and economic, nego200
tiators needed these exit options as safety valves. Rather than birth defects
that must be cured as soon as possible through ever more legalization, my
claim is that those exit options were, and remain, crucial preconditions for
trade deals to stick. Without them, the breadth and depth of substantive
WTO commitments would not have materialized. Similarly, weak remedies
were a crucial precondition for the otherwise strengthened WTO dispute
process. Knowing that they could no longer block dispute rulings, WTO
members were eager to limit the remedies or sanctions that would follow
201
any WTO condemnation. To drastically reduce or eliminate those exit options, that is, to further legalize the WTO—without countervailing increases
in participation, loyalty, and support for the WTO project—risks undermining the substantive commitment both to the WTO and to the DSU in
particular.
b. The Risks and Illusions of Depoliticization. Like further legalization,
calls to transform WTO rules into immutable human rights or, more generally, to keep WTO affairs extracted from politics and nontrade concerns,
would increase levels of discipline and precommitment. In addition, such
calls would also move the system away from, rather than closer to, participation, democratic accountability, and contestation. Hence their depiction in
202
Chart 2 above at Point 4. McGinnis and Mosvesian, for example, argue
that the WTO must limit itself to antidiscrimination principles and avoid
dealing with nontrade concerns such as health or environmental protection,
human rights or poverty. In their view, liberal trade, and hence the WTO, is
inherently in the interest of the majority; it reinforces democracy by neutralizing protectionist interest groups at home. International efforts to address
nontrade concerns, in contrast, must be avoided. They are necessarily captured by special interest groups aimed at skewing a decision in their favor,
203
against majority welfare.
meant to allow countermeasures that are disproportionate in light of the fact that the subsidies dealt
with under these provisions are prohibited”).
200. See sources cited supra note 57; see also Richard B. Bilder, Managing the Risks of
International Agreement 219–221 (1981) (referring to exit options in treaties as “RiskManagement Techniques”); B. Peter Rosendorff & Helen V. Milner, The Optimal Design of International Trade Institutions: Uncertainty and Escape, 55 Int’l Org. 829, 831 (2001).
201. Along the same lines, the United States, for the first time since the creation of GATT in
1947, made it explicit that WTO rules could not have direct effect before domestic U.S. courts. See
Uruguay Round Agreements Act, 19 U.S.C. § 3512 (1994). A similar provision is provided in E.C.
implementing legislation. See Case C-149/96, Portuguese Republic v. Council, 1999 E.C.R. I-8395.
Before 1995, the question of the effect of GATT in domestic U.S. law remained unresolved. See
Ronald Brand, The Status of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in United States Domestic
Law, 26 Stan. J. Int’l L. 479, 507 (1990).
202.

See McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 10.

203. Id. at 557 (rejecting international regulation other than the WTO’s antidiscrimination
model since “concentrated interest groups . . . will be able to exercise substantial influence to bring
about policies that serve their interests, rather than the public interest”); John O. McGinnis & Mark
L. Movsesian, Against Global Governance in the WTO, 45 Harv. Int’l L.J. 353, 355 (2004) (arguing that such “[r]egulatory bargains . . . are not as likely to be efficient in terms of nations’ true
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This theory obscures that the WTO is as much about protectionism as it
is about free trade. As one commentator observed, “[g]lobal economic rules
are not written by Platonic rulers, or their present-day pretenders, academic
economists. If WTO agreements were truly about ‘free trade,’ as their opponents like to point out, a single sentence would suffice: ‘There shall be free
204
trade.’ ” The reality is that there is as much politics at the WTO, with special interest groups clamoring for favors, as there is in domestic parliaments.
Protectionist agreements such as those concerning agriculture, textiles, or
antidumping, and agreements that favor one group of countries over another,
205
such as TRIPS, illustrate that the WTO does not necessarily lead to free
trade in favor of the majority, but represents a political deal brokered in the
context of power and special interests. There is nothing inherently wrong
about this, and even if so, little we can do about it. Nevertheless, to limit this
political bargaining game at the WTO to producer/exporter interest groups,
as McGinnis and Mosvesian suggest, on the ground that they are a proxy of
majority welfare is effectively elevating one set of special interests above all
206
others. Equally, to isolate the WTO from nontrade concerns—which, in
207
any event, is necessarily a fiction —puts one societal concern above all
others.
To this date, the world trade system remains focused primarily on nondiscrimination as opposed to economic efficiency and the protection of
208
producer as opposed to consumer welfare. No matter how inefficient a
regulation or trade policy is, or thus irrespective of consumer welfare, GATT
permits it as long as it is (inefficiently) applied across the board to everyone,
including foreign traders. From this perspective, the system neither avoids
harmful cross-border externalities nor does it inherently protect domestic
consumers. Both in the rules and exceptions that it sets up, such as equal
competitive opportunities rather than efficient regulation, and major carveouts for textiles and agriculture, as well as the escape clauses it provides for,
which are triggered each time by injury to domestic producers (not harm to
preferences . . . . [They] are more likely to represent ‘amoral’ wealth transfers among different
groups of citizens.”).
204. Dani Rodrik, Feasible Globalizations 19 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 9129, 2002), available at http://papers.nber.org/papers/w9129.pdf.
205. See Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of
International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 Yale J. Int'l L. 1, 320–24 (2004) (explaining
differential effect of TRIPS on superpowers versus developing countries).
206. See, e.g., Benvenisti, supra note 36; Keohane & Nye, supra note 119; Chantal Thomas,
Challenges for Democracy and Trade: The Case of the United States, 41 Harv. J. on Legis. 1, 8
(2004).
207. To exclude nontrade concerns from the WTO debate is a fiction. Even antidiscrimination
principles require decisions on nontrade questions (e.g., to decide whether two products are alike or
whether a discrimination can be justified, for example, by health concerns). See Kal Raustiala, Sovereignty and Multilateralism, 1 Chi. J. Int'l L. 401, 404–07 (2000). In the end, therefore, McGinnis
and Mosvesian’s theory will either lead to very minimal liberalization (since it would discipline only
discrimination that does not involve nontrade concerns) or lead to lopsided outcomes where trade
always trumps other preferences.
208.

See sources cited supra note 35.
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consumers), the system was created and continues to operate at the behest of
producers. It is wed as much to liberal trade as protecting existing producers. Instead of inherently protecting the majority, the trade system, thereby,
risks elevating special, that is, producer, interests above consumer concerns
209
and beyond the control of domestic politics. It imposes a double standard
to arbitrarily bind governments to any WTO rule because it is supposed to
increase economic welfare, which in many cases is not true, and to reject
international law in nontrade fields because it must be tainted by special
interests. Both processes are intensely political and both need more, rather
than less, participation, accountability, and contestation. Equally, both need
safeguards against abuse by special interest groups and to ensure fair treatment of weaker countries.
The risk of exploitation by special interests at the WTO is further increased by a general lack of domestic control, especially by national
210
parliaments, over a country’s trade policy. Moreover, once member-states
conclude a WTO agreement—unlike domestic law, including domestic constitutions—any one particular WTO member cannot change the agreement,
even by special or supermajority of its population. This immutability of treaties is, of course, all the more worrying in the context of an international
regime, like the WTO, where its rules and decisions matter and have real
211
consequences. As a result, rather than increasing discipline and precommitment, giving us more law, or depoliticizing the WTO, giving us less
politics, the trade regime requires certain exit options such as escape clauses
and flexible remedies and needs more, not less, space for politics, participation, and contestation. This includes more control by domestic politics,
democratic safety valves, and counterweight of international agreements on
nontrade concerns. If the WTO is to survive as a legitimate institution that
effectively liberalizes trade it will need the direct support of consumers and
citizens. Until now, export-driven, producer interests with allegedly only majority interests in mind have dominated the agenda at the WTO, effectively
209.

See Benvenisti, supra note 36.

210. See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Challenges to the Legitimacy and Efficiency of the World
Trading System: Democratic Governance and Competition Culture in the WTO, 7 J. Int’l Econ. L.
585, 589 (2004); Thomas, supra note 206, at 25.
211. Robert Howse, How to Begin to Think About the ‘Democratic Deficit’ at the WTO, in
International Economic Governance and Non-Economic Concerns 79, 94 (Stefan Griller
ed., Eur. Cmty. Stud. Assoc. Aus. Publ’n Series Vol. 5, 2003) (“[T]hese costs of and constraints on
reversibility, combined with the impact of new era trade rules in freezing or limiting regulatory
choices in many policy areas . . . constitute the most troubling aspect of the WTO’s ‘democratic
deficit’.”). This combination of factors led Weiler and Motoc to the following conclusion: “You take
the obedience claim of International Law and couple it with the conflation of government and State
which International Law posits and you get nothing more than a monstrous empowerment of the
executive branch at the expense of other political estates.” J.H.H. Weiler & Iulia Motoc, Taking
Democracy Seriously: The Normative Challenges to the International Legal System, in International Economic Governance and Non-Economic Concerns 47, 67 (Stefan Griller ed., Eur.
Cmty. Stud. Assoc. Aus. Publ’n Series Vol. 5, 2003); see also Armin von Bogdandy, Legitimacy of
International Economic Governance: Interpretative Approaches to WTO Law and the Prospects of
Its Proceduralization, in International Economic Governance and Non-Economic Concerns
103, 107 (Stefan Griller ed., Eur. Cmty. Stud. Assoc. Aus. Publ’n Series Vol. 5, 2003).
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isolating the issues from a broader political debate; this will no longer suffice.
B. A Better Framework for Reform
The core message of the previous Section is that current proposals for
WTO reform are focused exclusively on either the politics pole, such as getting rid of the consensus rule, or the law pole, such as reverting to old GATT
practices or, in contrast, further legalization/depoliticization. Conventional
suggestions for reform do not take sufficient account of the interaction between law and politics: in particular, the fact that any change on one side
calls for a reaction on the other. This law-and-politics, exit-and-voice balance is in constant flux and under constant threat. A minute alteration on one
side can change the balance the way pulling out one brick at one end of a
building can cause major cracks on the other end, and even the demise of
the entire construction. A better framework for reform realizes the fluid
equilibrium between law and politics, discipline and participation, and the
bidirectional relationship that brings it about. Although my line of reasoning
could stop here, and a variety of equilibria between the two poles are possi212
ble, the final Section of this Article does venture into a particular set of
reforms that would, in my view, improve the legitimacy and effectiveness of
the world trade system.
To remedy the WTO’s problems—lack of input and output legitimacy—
my claim is that the WTO needs more, not less, politics and participation of
individual members and nonstate actors; and more, not less, control by domestic politics and consideration of nontrade concerns. Moreover, it must
maintain, not eliminate, the possibility for exit especially when supported by
consumer welfare or democratic decision. Depicted in Chart 2 above, my
reform package is therefore situated at Point 5 (“Suggested Reform”): significantly more participation and politics and slightly less discipline or law
as compared to the present system.
Importantly, when implemented with care, the increase in politics and
participation ought not deadlock the political process; nor should maintaining certain exit options undermine the WTO’s normative structure. On the
contrary, the mere availability of certain exit options, such as safeguards or
temporary compensation/suspension in the event of violation, should facilitate reaching a political consensus and thus make rulemaking more efficient.
Equally, stronger outlets for voice and participation—more politics and
hence more support for WTO rules—should increase the legitimacy of the
trade system, strengthen the support for and effectiveness of the DSU, and
eventually reduce pressure on the exit option. Coming full circle, this reduced pressure to exit because of higher levels of support would mean that
212. Examining a very specific reform proposal in isolation, one could, for example, impose
stricter remedies in the DSU; that is, further reduce exit, but make it possible—or, reestablish the
equilibrium—by offering more voice or participation through public panel meetings and/or increasing exit elsewhere through explicitly denying direct effect of WTO law in domestic courts.
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the flexibility or exit options built into the system would be used only in
213
exceptional circumstances. They would, in other words, strengthen, not
undermine, the credibility of the WTO.
1. More Politics, Participation, and Contestation
Rather than decrease politics and participation—as some have suggested, for example, by getting rid of the WTO consensus rule or
depoliticizing WTO affairs—I suggest broadening the space for political
debate and contestation. For the world trade system to be legitimate and
sustainable, especially with a strong normative structure, more, not less,
214
politics are needed. In large part because of its foundational mechanics to
overcome protectionism by insulating export-interests from domestic politics, the world trade system remains too technocratic and too isolated from
popular support. To increase participation and support, the consensus rule
215
must be maintained but the participation of individual WTO members as
well as nonstate actors increased. The role consensus plays in the internal
and external legitimacy of the world trade system largely compensates for
the delay and lourdeur in WTO decisionmaking, as well as for the some216
times limited outcome in trade negotiations. The so-called bicycle club of
trade must be disbanded. It takes exporters and producers as the core constituency of the system and assumes that, to keep their support, the world
trade system requires ever more liberalization; otherwise, the bicycle will
fall over. To survive as a legitimate organization, the WTO must extend its
base to include consumers and citizens. It must, in other words, play out its
strongest card: that genuine free trade benefits the masses, not the few. Now
that those majority groups are increasingly better organized, be it in the political process or through NGOs, their voices must be heard directly. The
213. Another example of this is the increase, with the creation of the WTO, in reservations to
renegotiate tariff concessions pursuant to GATT art. XXVIII:5. See supra note 196. This increase in
reservations or potential exit options, however, did not result in more actual renegotiations taking
place. On the contrary, during the period 1995–1999, the lowest number of tariff renegotiations
actually took place (eight as opposed to, for example, fifty-six between 1980 and 1999). Hoda,
supra note 196, at 88, 107. This shows that the mere existence of exit options can be enough and
need not necessarily lead to more instances of actual exit.
214. See Thomas Cottier, Limits to International Trade: The Constitutional Challenge, 2000
Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. 220, 221; Howse, supra note 26; Robert Howse & Kalypso Nicolaïdis,
Legitimacy and Global Governance: Why Constitutionalizing the WTO is a Step Too Far, in Efficiency, Equity, and Legitimacy: The Multilateral Trading System at the Millennium
227, 248–49 (Roger B. Porter et al. eds., 2001); David Kennedy, The Forgotten Politics of International Governance, 2001 Eur. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 117, 124; von Bogdandy, supra note 19.
215.

In support of the consensus rule, see supra Section II.A.1.

216. In terms of the trilemma introduced by Dani Rodrik—deep economic integration versus
nation state versus democratic politics—limited economic integration or results in trade negotiations
because of the consensus rule may well be the price to pay for placating concerns of state sovereignty and democracy. Rodrik, supra note 204, at 13–18; see also Markus Krajewski, Democratic
Legitimacy and Constitutional Perspectives of WTO Law, 35 J. World Trade 167, 168 (2001);
Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Mission Impossible: Resolving the WTO’s Trilemma 8 (unpublished manuscript,
on file with the author).
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proxy of exporters/producers allegedly representing majority interests is no
longer needed and can, in any event, no longer suffice.
In practical terms, political reinforcement and higher levels of contestation could be achieved through more active and frequent participation of
217
senior policymakers in Geneva-based discussions, obliging countries that
plan to block a broad consensus to explain in writing why the matter is one
218
of vital interest to them and implementing the currently dead letter rule
that when consensus cannot be reached at a particular meeting, the matter
must be transferred to the WTO’s General Council, thereby exposing con219
tentious issues to a more visible and political debate. Other ways to ensure
participation and contestation in WTO decisionmaking include more transparency in the process itself, such as public meetings, readily available and
readable documents and position papers, and openness in the formation and
membership of smaller informal groups that meet even before an issue is put
220
on the WTO table. When it comes to developing countries, regional and
issue groupings can strengthen their voice or participation, as is increasingly
the case through, for example, the African Group; the Group of 20, mainly
large developing countries; and the Group of 90, a broader cross-section of
221
developing countries including in particular the poorest ones. In addition,
more attention to developing countries as well as technical assistance from
the rich world is needed to ensure that the poorest countries are at least represented at WTO meetings that affect them, and to clearly define what the
interests of a given developing country are in a specific trade matter. Too
often it is not so much that developing country interests are not sufficiently
defended; it is that they are not sufficiently defined.
Increased voice or participation by nonstate actors, such as NGOs, small
businesses, the rural poor, and citizens at large, ought not focus so much on
222
having a seat or microphone in WTO meetings (as useful as this may be),
nor does it require any explicit approval by WTO members. Given that the
WTO matters and carries consequences, and exit from it has been signifi217.

See Sutherland Report, supra note 18, at 70.

218.

Id. at 64.

219. See Rule 33 of the respective Rules of Procedure of the subordinate Councils, Committees, and other bodies of the WTO, referred to in Ehlermann & Ehring, supra note 74, at 52.
220. See Markus Krajewski, From Green Room to Glass Room—Participation of
Developing Countries and Internal Transparency in the WTO Decision-Making Process
6–11 (2000); Jeffrey J. Schott & Jayashree Watal, Decision Making in the WTO, in The WTO After Seattle 283, 285–89 (Jeffrey J. Schott ed., 2000).
221. Such groupings or coalitions need not be permanent and may, given the heterogeneous
nature of the vast number of developing countries, depend on a particular issue. The changing coalitions that can be formed within the informal consensus process offer a distinct advantage over
weighted voting, in which coalitions are fixed for all questions based on, for example, regional
geography.
222. See, e.g., Daniel C. Esty, Non-Governmental Organizations at the World Trade Organization: Cooperation, Competition, or Exclusion, 1 J. Int’l Econ. L. 123, 131 (1998); Gabrielle
Marceau & Peter N. Pedersen, Is the WTO Open and Transparent?, 33 J. World Trade 5, 44–45
(1999).
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cantly reduced, state and nonstate actors alike are using the voice mechanism and injecting politics in the debates, whether the WTO as an
organization or its individual members like it or not. Voice is activated, for
example, when citizens protest at WTO Ministerial Meetings, when NGOs
issue reports or give interviews criticizing the TRIPS agreement or export
subsidies in the rich world, or when business associations bash the latest
223
WTO panel report. In other words, nonstate actors can and do influence
the WTO political process even without a formal say or vote in WTO decisionmaking. In fact, rather than NGOs and citizens needing the help or
blessing of the WTO, for example through formal permission to attend
WTO meetings, it is the WTO that needs the input and support of NGOs and
224
citizens to implement and legitimize its activities. Crucially, the sounding
board of NGOs is not limited to, or even most important in, Geneva. Although NGOs have an important lobbying and information role to play at
the WTO itself, adding social and expert legitimacy to the organization,
their activity is even more crucial at the grass-roots level. They constitute a
direct, transnational interface or voice mechanism through which citizens
and consumers can transmit concerns and obtain information about WTO
activities and decisions. To enable and foster these diverse forms of participation, contestation, and dissemination, the WTO itself must improve the
transparency of its activities, including its dispute settlement process. To
bring the WTO closer to the public, the creation of regional WTO offices
must be considered. In addition, thought could be given to setting up a WTO
inspection mechanism similar to that available in the World Bank and re225
gional development banks.
More voice or input ought finally be given to other international organizations including those addressing nontrade concerns. Because of the
strength of the WTO’s legal-normative structure, in particular its automatic
dispute process, the WTO is too often portrayed, most recently in the Suth226
erland Report itself, as a set of rules that prevail over other international

223. As Hirschman points out, voice is broader than formal input in decisionmaking. It can be
equated with interest articulation and “is a far more ‘messy’ concept [than exit] because it can be
graduated, all the way from faint grumbling to violent protest,” from contestation to kicking up a
fuss. Hirschman, supra note 15, at 16.
224. See Steve Charnovitz, WTO Cosmopolitics, 34 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 299, 353
(2002); Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 Yale L.J. 2347 (1991).
225. See Inspection Panel of the World Bank, World Bank, Accountability at the
World Bank: The Inspection Panel 10 Years On (2003). A similar system for the WTO could
increase its accountability in that it permits affected groups and individuals to challenge the
substance of official WTO activities—such as technical cooperation—under the guidelines and rules
of the WTO itself.
226. Sutherland Report, supra note 18, at 38 (“ ‘[C]onditionalities’ imposed by the IMF
and World Bank should not only be supportive but consistent with WTO obligations.”); id. at 39
(“The WTO legal system is part of the international legal system, but it is a lex specialis. This lex
specialis, qua lex specialis cannot be changed from the outside by other international organizations
that have different membership and different rules regarding the creation of rules.”). The latter
statement is in direct contradiction of Articles 30 and 48 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
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227

law. Given the broad field and scope of the trade system—at least tangentially affecting the protection of the environment, human rights, cultural
diversity, etc.—this WTO “superiority complex” frequently takes other in228
ternational negotiations hostage. Both in its lawmaking and dispute
settlement, the WTO must take account of activities and rules created elsewhere, in particular those that the disputing parties themselves have
consented to. This is not a call for the WTO itself to engage in environ229
mental or human rights lawmaking. Rather, let other organizations do this,
but when such is done, the WTO, as a part of the broader international system, must take cognizance and when appropriate defer to the rules agreed to
230
in those other fora. WTO cooperation with other international rules and
organizations is part and parcel of greater contestation and participation in
the world trade system itself. No matter how elusive and messy, such coordination between, for example, trade and human rights or environmental
regimes “highlight[s] the contingency of the limits of individual regimes,
231
their dependence on other regimes, and the politics of regime-definition.”
2. Slightly Reduce Discipline and Maintain
and Clarify Exit Options
The increase in politics, voice, and participation of both state and nonstate actors advocated above ought to offer a more solid basis of support for
a strong WTO normative regime. Yet, to facilitate this messy voice mechanism—in particular, consensus building and the varied avenues for input
from nonstate actors—and to prevent deadlock in the political decisionmaking process, it is important to keep certain exit options open and not to overlegalize the system. With the assurance of exit in the worst-case scenario,
WTO members will more easily join a political consensus to create new
Treaties addressing, respectively, the interaction between earlier and later treaties and inter se modifications of multilateral treaties.
227. Keohane speaks of partial globalization. Robert O. Keohane, Power and Governance in a Partially Globalized World (2002). For Ruggie, a crucial element in the
globalization backlash is “a growing imbalance in global rule making. Those rules that favor global
market expansion have become more robust and enforceable . . . . But rules intended to promote
equally valid social objectives, be they labor standards, human rights, environmental quality or
poverty reduction, lag behind and in some instances actually have become weaker.” John Gerard
Ruggie, Taking Embedded Liberalism Global: The Corporate Connection, in Taming Globalization: Frontiers of Governance 93, 96–97 (David Held & Mathias Koenig-Archibugi eds.,
2003).
228. See Joost Pauwelyn, WTO Compassion or Superiority Complex? What to Make of the
WTO Waiver for “Conflict Diamonds”, 24 Mich. J. Int’l L. 1177 (2003).
229. Contra Andrew T. Guzman, Global Governance and the WTO, 45 Harv. Int’l L.J. 303,
307 (2004) (advocating that the WTO itself should negotiate treaties on nontrade concerns).
230. See Joost Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law: How
WTO Law Relates to Other Rules of International Law 158–212 (2003).
231. Martti Koskenniemi, Global Legal Pluralism: Multiple Regimes and
Multiple Modes of Thought 20 (2005), available at http://www.valt.helsinki.fi/blogs/eci/
PluralismHarvard.pdf.
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rules. Crucially, limited exit options and slightly lower levels of discipline
may offer important democratic safety valves and thereby respond to criticisms of a WTO constitution-type construct that imposes free trade over and
above anything else. In large part because of its foundational mechanics of
overcoming protectionism by insulating export-interests from domestic politics, the world trade system risks being too rigid or legalized to respond to
valid flexibility demands of representative politics and of other international
232
regimes. Limited exit options, when combined with the suggested high
levels of participation, would eventually not often be resorted to; given the
high levels of participation in lawmaking and the other pressures felt
through the voice mechanism, in particular from consumers and businesses
in favor of free trade, countries ought only exercise these exit options in exceptional circumstances. In the end, therefore, rather than undermine the
normative structure of the WTO, limited exit or somewhat lower levels of
discipline—in tandem with higher levels of participation and politics—is the
best recipe for an effective and legitimate world trade system.
In practical terms, the WTO should relinquish its obsession with the sin233
gle-package idea. Given the huge diversity among WTO members, both in
terms of economic development and noneconomic preferences, WTO
agreements and rules ought not always be binding on all WTO members. With
close to 150 members, differentiation or a multiple-speed WTO is unavoidable. Rather than force new commitments on unwilling countries through
majority voting or block the entire process by insisting on consensus amongst
all players, the system must recognize its diversity and tailormake its rules
to its different constituencies. Even soft law, or political declarations or targets that are not legally binding, as an alternative to the usually hard WTO
234
commitments could, in certain cases, be considered. The need for consensus amongst all WTO members to add a plurilateral agreement to the WTO
treaty, even if such agreement is binding only on some WTO members, must
be revisited. Even within the E.U., with its far more homogeneous member235
ship, this strict requirement for differentiation no longer applies. Although
some control by the entire WTO membership over new agreements is useful,
for example to make sure that plurilateral agreements do not harm the rights
of third parties, a single member ought not have a veto to block further
WTO progress by others.
In addition, the WTO must maintain its broad, substantive exceptions,
tariff and other renegotiation provisions, waiver system, and safety valves in
case of violation in the form of temporary compensation and suspension of
232.

See supra note 211.

233.

Sutherland Report, supra note 18, at 65–66 (referring to “variable geometry”).

234. See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, International Action on Bribery and Corruption: Why the Dog Didn’t Bark in the WTO, in The Political Economy of International Trade
Law 177 (Daniel Kennedy & James Southwick eds., 2002).
235. European Constitution, supra note 142, art. III-325, 2004 O.J. (C 310) 146–48; see
Bruno De Witte et al., Introduction to The Many Faces of Differentiation in E.U. Law, at ix, ix
(Bruno De Witte et al. eds., 2001).
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concessions. The scope for bilateral settlement of trade disputes and the
conclusion of nontrade agreements in other international fora must be clarified. Given that WTO obligations are not collective obligations binding erga
236
omnes partes, settlements and non-WTO treaties in deviation of WTO
rules must be accepted as permissible for as long as they do not affect the
rights of third parties.
In turn, safeguards remain an important safety valve under existing
237
commitments and a crucial instrument in obtaining new commitments.
The Appellate Body, in contrast, has taken an openly unsympathetic stance
against safeguards, calling them purely protectionist measures in response to
fair trade, or a sudden increase in imports. It has contrasted safeguards, in
particular, to antidumping measures, which it regards as a reaction to unfair
238
trade in the form of dumped imports. As a result, the Appellate Body has
strictly interpreted the conditions for safeguards and so far not found a sin239
gle safeguard measure to be in line with WTO rules. The Appellate Body’s
strict interpretation of safeguards and rather loose approach to antidumping
measures provides an incentive for WTO members to exploit the loopholes
of the antidumping agreement. Unlike safeguards—which must, in principle, be imposed on all imports, offset only injury caused to the domestic
industry and be compensated for, at least after three years, in some cases, as
240
of their enactment—antidumping measures are subject to manipulation,
are discriminatory, offset the entire dumping margin—which is often higher
241
than the injury caused—and must never be compensated for. Rather than
inciting the use and abuse of antidumping, the Appellate Body should recognize the crucial role, transparency, and benefits linked to safeguards and
promote safeguards over antidumping measures, or at least put them on an
equal footing.
At the same time, WTO contingency measures—safeguards, antidumping duties, and countervailing duties to offset subsidies—focus exclusively
236. See Joost Pauwelyn, A Typology of Multilateral Treaty Obligations: Are WTO Obligations Bilateral or Collective in Nature?, 14 Eur. J. Int’l L. 907 (2003).
237. See Claude E. Barfield, U.S. Steel Tariffs Gave Safeguards a Bad Name, Fin. Times, Dec.
8, 2003, at 13 (U.S. ed.).
238. See Alan O. Sykes, The Safeguards Mess: A Critique of WTO Jurisprudence, 2 World
Trade Rev. 261 (2003). The distinction between fair and unfair trade is questionable. Any economist will explain why dumping, as it is defined by the WTO (which permits the artificial
reconstruction of cost of production and provides wiggling room to find dumping for many imports,
if one looks and calculates hard enough), is most often not unfair.
239. See William J. Davey, The WTO Dispute Settlement System: The First Decade, Paper
presented at the World Trade Forum (June 4–5, 2004) (on file with the author) (criticizing the Appellate Body’s record on safeguards); Sykes, supra note 238.
240. See Claude Barfield, High-Tech Protectionism: The Irrationality of Antidumping Laws 11 (2003) (“This process [of establishing whether there is dumping] is essentially
pro forma: Between 1980 and 1997, the [U.S. Commerce] department ruled that dumping was taking place in 96 percent of the cases it reviewed.”).
241. See Joost Pauwelyn, A Comparative Analysis of Trade Remedies in the WTO, in Safeguards under the WTO Agreement: Issues and Proposals for a More Effective
Mechanism 21 (Araki Ichiro & Kawase Tsuyoshi eds., 2004).
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on harm to competing producers. They share one common feature: the reintroduction of trade restrictions is permitted only when producer welfare has
been, or threatens to be, negatively affected either as a result of cheap imports, subsidies to foreign producers, or increased imports—which trigger,
respectively, antidumping duties, countervailing duties, and safeguards.
Harm to consumers or considerations of consumer welfare play no role
whatsoever. First, before raising trade barriers against cheaper imports,
countries currently must not consider the harm they thereby cause to consumers. Second, no escape clause or safety valve exists to reintroduce trade
restrictions based on consumer concerns or so-called collective preferences
of citizens on nontrade issues ranging from the death penalty and cultural
242
preferences to GMOs and welfare state interventions. Even when democratically expressed as a majority opinion, such consumer concerns can only
be taken into account under the limited list of substantive exceptions, such
as GATT Article XX. The exclusive focus of WTO contingency measures on
producer welfare confirms the system’s exporter/producer-driven nature. As
pointed out earlier, if the WTO is to survive as a legitimate institution, it
must expand its base of supporters beyond exporters/producers and include
consumers and citizens at large, who are, after all, the main beneficiaries of
liberalized trade. Much as safety valves were needed to attract and maintain
producer support in the form of safeguards and antidumping and countervailing duties in the original GATT, a WTO genuinely transformed into a
consumer-driven organization must have clear and sufficient safety valves to
243
attract and maintain consumer support.
Finally, although the exit-voice balance for each individual WTO member may be different, depending in particular on its relative power and
internal political system, given that the possibility and comfort of exit options is so important in the WTO structure, it must be guaranteed for all
WTO members, including developing countries. The major concern for developing countries in the WTO simply is not, as many perceive it today, how
developing countries will succeed in pushing their complaints against rich
244
developed nations. Rather, the big question will be how developing
242. Pascal Lamy, The Emergence of Collective Preferences in International Trade: Implications for Regulating Globalisation, Speech at Conference on “Collective Preferences and Global
Gouvernance: What Future for the Multilateral Trading System” (Sept. 15, 2004), available at
http://trade-info.cec.eu.int/doclib/docs/2004/september/tradoc_118929.pdf; Rodrik, supra note 204.
243. For such an alternative safeguard mechanism, linked to compulsory compensation, see
Lamy, supra note 242. See also Patrick A. Messerlin, Antidumping and Safeguards, in The WTO
After Seattle 159 (Jeffrey J. Schott ed., 2000); Heinz Hauser & Alexander Roitinger, New Concepts for Dispute Settlement Implementation (Oct. 2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
author) (suggesting the replacement of antidumping and safeguards with one safeguard mechanism
that can be invoked for any reason, not just injury to the domestic injury, but coupled with an obligation to pay compensation).
244. See Marc L. Busch & Eric Reinhardt, Developing Countries and General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement, 37 J. World Trade 719 (2003). In
most cases such complaints will be successful, if they have legal merit, because of the peer pressure
on, and example-setting function of, those rich members, not because of tougher remedies. Indeed,
not a single panel or Appellate Body recommendation involving a WTO dispute by a developing
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countries can take equal advantage as defendants of the escape clauses and
other exit options just described, especially against rich nations. Few of
245
those options include differential treatment for developing countries.
Thought should be given to whether and how such differential rules could
be included without making escape clauses too easy an option for developing countries. After all, in most cases, trade rules are also beneficial for the
country reducing trade barriers. The costly and complex procedures for the
imposition of safeguards could, for example, be simplified when pursued by
developing countries; waivers for developing countries could be granted by
a lower majority and extended for longer periods; the compensation that
developing countries should pay under tariff or GATS re-negotiations or
when settling a dispute as a defendant could be lowered, as could the level
of suspensions in response to breach by developing countries. With developing countries committing themselves to ever more WTO rules, the
importance of flexibility and limited exit options for those countries—and
for the sustainability and legitimacy of the world trade system as a whole—
will only increase.
Conclusion
This Article challenges a number of common perceptions about the
world trade system. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the system did not
evolve from trade politics to trade law. Rather, both the level of law and the
level of politics gradually increased. More politics and participation, in particular consensus decisionmaking, enabled more law and discipline,
including the legalization of GATT’s dispute process. Conversely, more law
and discipline, in particular the WTO’s smooth and automatic enforcement
mechanism, required more politics and participation, including a vigorous
defense by countries of the consensus rule. More than the traditional frompolitics-to-law story, this interactive narrative between politics and law, participation and discipline, voice and exit, better explains why, for example,
decisionmaking evolved from majority voting to consensus, and why enforcement evolved from a diplomatic system to a quasi-judicial one. The
alternative narrative demonstrates further that increased legalization in the
form of more supervision by the WTO must not come at the expense of less
politics in the form of less input from member countries. Rather, more discipline and law requires and leads to higher levels of participation and
contestation: more politics. Moreover, through this lens, the current combination of a highly efficient dispute settlement system and a consensusbased, inefficient rulemaking process no longer strikes one as a paradox.

country against a developed country remains unimplemented. Almost all of the problems with noncompliance were disputes between the E.C. and the U.S.
245. There are certain substantive exceptions and safeguards that cannot be applied against
certain developing countries. WTO Agreement, supra note 3, Agreement on Safeguards, Annex 1A
art. 9.1, 1869 U.N.T.S. 154.
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Instead, it is seen as a logical—although not necessarily optimal—balance
between high discipline or law and high participation or politics.
In prescriptive terms, this Article portrays a fortress WTO or a regime
that currently lacks both input and output legitimacy. Given the prevailing schools of thought, the risk of a fortress WTO—over-legalized,
depoliticized, and forcing a uniform, regulatory straitjacket upon countries and their peoples—is, indeed, looming. To avoid this threat, the
Article rejects the most common proposals for WTO reform. First, replacing the consensus rule with majority-based decisionmaking (the
insider, institutionalist perspective); further legalizing the system with
less exit options and a stronger dispute process (the legalist view); or a
stricter separation of WTO affairs from domestic politics (advocated by
both the utilitarian and the constitutional/human rights schools), may
each make the system more efficient in the short term. When implemented in isolation, however, these reforms would undermine the
support and legitimacy of the world trade system: efficiency without loyalty. Second, reintroducing political vetoes in the dispute process as in
the conservative, sovereigntist perspective or subjecting the system to
full control by representative politics as advocated by left-leaning cosmopolitans are reforms that may increase the short-term support for, and
legitimacy of, the WTO. Yet they would quickly render the system ineffective and dramatically reduce gains from trade: loyalty without
efficiency. As an alternative to these two strands of proposals, which focus exclusively on one side of the law-and-politics spectrum and, quite
surprisingly, lump together unlikely allies such as utilitarians and human
rights scholars, sovereigntists and cosmopolitans, this Article suggests a
more balanced reform package that tackles both sides of the spectrum.
First, the WTO needs more, not less, politics; it needs participation and
contestation, from both state and nonstate actors, both in and outside the
WTO. Second, the system must maintain and clarify, not eliminate, certain escape clauses and exit options, especially those tailored to
consumer welfare, and make them viable also for weak countries. With
the right balance between flexibility and precommitment, politics and
law, participation and discipline, the world trade system can combine
efficiency and legitimacy; that is, it can reap the gains from trade and
enjoy broad-based support.
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